How Basis Risk and Spatiotemporal Adverse Selection Influence Demand for Index Insurance: Evidence from Northern Kenya by Jensen, Nathaniel et al.
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
How Basis Risk and Spatiotemporal
Adverse Selection Influence Demand for
Index Insurance: Evidence from
Northern Kenya
Nathaniel Jensen and Andrew Mude and Christopher Barrett
Cornell University, International Livestock Research Institute,
Cornell University
11 July 2016
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/72484/
MPRA Paper No. 72484, posted 13 July 2016 05:40 UTC
 HOW BASIS RISK AND SPATIOTEMPORAL ADVERSE SELECTION INFLUENCE DEMAND 
FOR INDEX INSURANCE: EVIDENCE FROM NORTHERN KENYA 
 
 
By NATHANIEL D. JENSEN, ANDREW G. MUDE AND CHRISTOPHER B. BARRETT  
 
 
JUNE, 2016 
 
 
 
 
Abstract: Basis risk – the remaining risk that an insured individual faces – is widely 
acknowledged as the Achilles Heel of index insurance, but to date there has been no direct 
study of its role in determining demand for index insurance. Further, spatiotemporal variation 
in risk, and therefore basis risk, creates the possibility of adverse selection. We use 
longitudinal household data to determine which factors effect demand for index based 
livestock insurance (IBLI). We find that both price and the non-price factors studied 
previously are indeed important, but that basis risk and spatiotemporal adverse selection play 
a major role in demand for IBLI. 
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Risk management interventions have become a priority for development agencies as the enormous cost 
of uninsured risk exposure, especially to the rural poor, has become increasingly and widely appreciated. 
Improved risk management through innovative insurance products is hypothesized to crowd in credit access, 
induce investments in productivity, support informal social transfers, and generally stimulate growth and 
poverty reduction (Hess et al. 2005; Skees, Hartell & Hao 2006; Barrett et al. 2007; Barnett, Barrett & 
Skees 2008; Boucher, Carter & Guirkinger 2008; Skees & Collier 2008; Giné & Yang 2009; Hellmuth et 
al. 2009; Karlan et al. 2014). Although insurance products offer a proven means to manage risk through 
formal financial markets, asymmetric information problems—adverse selection and moral hazard—and 
high fixed costs per unit insured effectively preclude conventional indemnity insurance for many 
smallholder crop and livestock farmers in developing countries.  
Index insurance products have flourished over the past decade as a promising approach to address these 
obstacles. These products use easily observed, exogenous signals to provide insurance coverage for 
covariate risk. Anchoring indemnity payments to external indicators, not policyholders’ realized losses, 
eliminates the need to verify claims, which is particularly costly in remote areas with poor infrastructure, 
and mitigates the familiar incentive challenges associated with moral hazard and adverse selection that 
plague traditional insurance. These gains do come at a cost, however; “basis risk” is the residual risk born 
by insurees due to the imperfect association between experienced losses and indemnification based on index 
values. Furthermore, a form of adverse selection may remain if prospective purchasers have information 
about expected indemnity payments that is not reflected in the product’s pricing (Carriquiry & Osgood 
2012; Jensen, Barrett, Mude 2016a). Such adverse selection could reflect inter-temporal information on 
upcoming conditions that affect insured covariate risk– such as climate forecasts – or knowledge that the 
effective loading (subsidy) rate varies across space. 
The explosion of interest in index insurance has resulted in a proliferation of pilot programs across the 
developing world. A burgeoning literature addresses various aspects of theoretical and applied concerns in 
the design, implementation, and assessment of index insurance products (Barnett & Mahul 2007; Barrett et 
al.2007; Binswanger-Mkhize 2012; Chantarat et al. 2007; Clarke 2016; Miranda & Farrin 2012). Despite 
the celebrated promise of index insurance, uptake in pilot programs around the globe has been generally 
low, and there are as of yet no examples of clear success stories with demonstrable capacity for scalability 
or sustainability over the long run (Smith & Watts 2010; Hazell & Hess 2010; Leblois & Quiron 2013). As 
a result, most empirical research on index insurance in developing countries has focused on identifying the 
barriers to insurance uptake. The existing literature finds that demand for index insurance is price sensitive, 
as expected, but most studies find that demand is inelastic and between studies there is considerable 
variation in the price elasticity of demand, ranging from -0.44 to -1.16 (Mobarak & Rosenzweig 2012; Cole 
et al. 2013; Hill, Robles & Ceballos 2013). And, with the exception of the Ghanaian farmers studied by 
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Karlan et al. (2014), uptake has been low even at heavily subsidized prices.1 With evidence that price plays 
only a small part in determining demand, researchers have turned to examining the role of household-
specific non-price factors. Risk aversion, wealth, financial liquidity, understanding of the product, trust in 
the provider, and access to informal risk pooling commonly exhibit significant, although sometimes 
inconsistent, impacts on demand (Giné, Townsend & Vickery 2008; Chantarat, Mude & Barrett 2009; Pratt, 
Suarez & Hess 2010; Cai, de Janvry & Sadoulet 2011; Clarke 2016; Janzen, Carter & Ikegami 2012; Liu 
& Myers 2012; Mobarak & Rosenzweig 2012; Cole et al. 2013; McIntosh, Sarris, & Papadopoulos 2013; 
Dercon et al. 2014).  
Although basis risk and the possibility of spatiotemporal adverse selection are widely understood as 
prospective weaknesses of index insurance, the empirical research has thus far not directly explored the 
role that either of these product-specific factors plays in influencing product uptake. But if the insurance 
index is imperfectly correlated with the stochastic welfare variable of interest (e.g., income, assets), then 
index insurance may offer limited risk management value; indeed purchasing index insurance can increase, 
rather than decrease, purchasers’ risk exposure (Jensen, Barret & Mude 2016a). Furthermore, prospective 
purchasers may perceive that an index insurance product is mispriced for their specific location or for the 
upcoming season, given information they have on the average and period-specific covariate risk in a 
location.  
Both of these problems exist generally in index insurance contracts and either might adversely affect 
uptake. Yet the impact of these prospective weaknesses in index insurance products has not been carefully 
researched to date, although a few studies use coarse proxies for idiosyncratic risk—a component of basis 
risk—those studies rely on hypothetical and untested relationships between the proxies and basis risk 
(Karlan et al. 2014; Mobarak & Rosenzweig 2012). To the authors’ knowledge, no study to date, examines 
the role of spatiotemporal adverse selection. This lacuna arises primarily because the vast majority of 
products fielded to date remain unable to determine the level of basis risk inherent in their product design; 
the products were designed from data series on index variables (e.g., rainfall, crop growth model 
predictions), not from longitudinal household asset or income data from the target population to be insured. 
This paper fills that important gap, exploiting an unusually rich longitudinal dataset from northern Kenya 
and a research design that includes randomized inducements to purchase index-based livestock insurance 
(IBLI) and a randomized IBLI education intervention that improves understanding of IBIL, in order to 
examine the relationship between basis risk and spatiotemporal adverse selection on index insurance uptake. 
This is the first paper to do so using observed data on losses to examine the role of basis risk in demand for 
                                                     
1 
The high demand for rainfall insurance in Ghana is somewhat of a mystery. Karlan et al. (2014) point to the role that insurance grants and 
indemnity payments play, but those same processes have been observed elsewhere unaccompanied by similar levels of demand.  
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index insurance a low-income country context. In addition, specific features of the contracts and data allow 
us to examine the role of adverse selection in demand, as topic wholly unstudied with respect to index 
insurance because it is often assumed to be non-existent or negligible.  
Echoing the prior literature, we find that price, liquidity, and social connectedness affect demand in the 
expected ways. In addition, we find that increased basis risk is associated with lower demand and that 
households’ response to basis risk is stronger among those with experimentally increased knowledge of 
IBLI. Although we argue and provide evidence that basis risk is almost surly exogenous, we cannot vary it 
experimentally and so, make no causal claims. 
Furthermore, we observe patterns in demand that are consistent with spatiotemporal adverse. Households 
in divisions with greater average losses (insurable risk) and those with less basis risk have greater demand 
for index insurance. Again, the response to basis risk is stronger among those that have a better 
understanding of the product. There is also strong evidence of intertemporal adverse selection as households 
are more likely to purchase insurance and purchase greater coverage before seasons in which remotely 
sensed data indicate coming covariate threats, which has large implications for the profits of the 
underwriters. Additional analysis of the relationship between subjective expectation of coming rangeland 
conditions and demand shows that households are also responding to private information on conditions, but 
in this case they reduce demand during seasons in which they expect poor rangeland conditions. One 
plausible interpretation of the above findings on intertemporal adverse selection is that demand increases 
in response to signals of coming covariate shocks and falls in response to the threat of idiosyncratic shocks.  
These findings suggest that product design is extremely important to get right and that, although it is 
expensive to do so, it is important to collect household level socio-economic, index insurance demand, and 
loss data and to use the data to improve product qualtiy. This and other research on IBLI has led to multiple 
iterations of the IBLI product as the implementers strive to create a high quality product that generates 
considerable demand. To date, many of those changes have been successful, generating considerable 
demand as the IBLI product was introduced into other regions of Kenya and Ethiopia. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 discusses risk among pastoralists in 
northern Kenya and the motivation for and design of the IBLI product offered to them. Section 2 develops 
a stylized model of livestock ownership and the role of insurance, which is then developed into four 
hypothesis on the structural determinants of demand. Section 3 presents the research design and data, 
followed by an explanation and summary of key variables in Section 4. Section 5 describes the econometric 
strategy used to analyze demand for IBLI. The hypotheses are tested in Section 6, which then closes with a 
discussion of the implications of our findings. 
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1 Drought-Related Livestock Mortality & Index Insurance in Kenya  
Livestock represent the principal source of income across most pastoral households (mean=69% and 
median=95% in our data) as well as the highest value productive asset they own. Livestock face 
considerable mortality risk, rendering pastoral households particularly vulnerable to herd mortality shocks. 
Among these, drought-related livestock mortality has consistently emerged as the greatest risk faced by 
pastoralists in the arid and semi-arid lands (ASAL) of the Horn of Africa (McPeak & Barrett 2001; McPeak, 
Little & Doss 2012, Barrett & Santos 2014). For example, between June 2000 and June 2002, surveyed 
pastoralists reported that drought-related factors accounted for 53% of the livestock deaths that they 
experienced, and disease, which is often associated with droughts, caused an additional 30% mortality 
during that period (McPeak, Little & Doss 2012). Drought is the reported cause of 62% of livestock 
mortality in our 2009-12 sample from northern Kenya. Droughts represent a covariate risk that may be 
especially difficult for existing social risk pooling schemes to handle because losses can impact all members 
of the risk pool. Thus, the seemingly largely covariate risk profile pastoralists face seems well-suited for 
coverage by an index product. 
The index based livestock insurance (IBLI) product was launched as a commercial pilot in January 2010 
in the arid and semi-arid Marsabit District of Kenya to offer formal insurance coverage against livestock 
losses due to drought. Specifically, the IBLI product covers predicted area average livestock mortality that 
arises due to severe forage shortages associated with drought. 
The IBLI index is derived from the Normalized Difference Vegetation Index (NDVI), an indicator of 
photosynthetic activity in observed vegetation as reflected in spectral data remotely sensed from satellite 
platforms at high spatiotemporal resolution. These NDVI data are reliably and cheaply accessible in near 
real-time, and with a sufficiently long historical record to allow for accurate pricing of the IBLI product. 
The statistical relationship between NDVI and livestock mortality was estimated using historic household 
level livestock mortality rates and NDVI values from January 2000 through January 2008 and then tested 
out-of-sample against a different set of seasonal household panel data collected 2000-2 in the same region 
(Chantarat et al. 2013).2 The resulting response function generates estimates of division average livestock 
                                                     
2  Monthly household-level livestock mortality data were collected by the Arid Lands Resource Management Project (ALRMP, 
http://www.aridland.go.ke/). The seasonal household panel data used for out-of-sample evaluation come from the Pastoral Risk Management project 
(http://dyson.cornell.edu/special_programs/AFSNRM/Parima/projectdata.htm).  
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mortality rate.3 IBLI appears to be the only index insurance product currently on the market that was 
developed using longitudinal household data so as to minimize the design component of basis risk.4  
A commercial underwriter offers IBLI contracts written on this predicted livestock mortality rate index 
(see Chantarat et al. 2013 for more details on data and product design). The index is calculated separately 
for each of the five administrative divisions in Marsabit, allowing for variation in indemnity rates between 
divisions. The commercial underwriter set a single strike level—the index level above which indemnity 
payments are made—at 15% predicted livestock mortality and aggregated the five index divisions into two 
premium regions. Notably, the aggregation of index divisions into premium regions results in variation in 
loadings/subsidies between index divisions, opening the door for spatial adverse selection.5 A detailed 
summary of the contract parameters (e.g., geographical segmentation of coverage, temporal coverage of 
the contract, conditions for contract activation, indemnification schedule, pricing structure) is presented in 
Appendix A. 
During the first sales season in January 2010, 1,974 policies were sold covering the long rain/long dry 
season of 2010 (LRLD10) and following short rain/short dry season (SRSD10), from March 1, 2010-
Ferburary 28, 2011. The intention was to have a sales window during the two-month period before the onset 
of each bimodal rainy season. Due to logistical and contractual complications, IBLI was not available for 
purchase during the August/September 2010 or January/February 2012 periods. In total, there have been 
four sales windows and six seasons of coverage during the timeframe considered in this paper. Table 1 
presents summary statistics for IBLI sales over the four rounds that fall within our sample period.  
Notably, there was a fall in IBLI uptake over the 2010-2012 period. Although inconsistency of sales 
windows, a change in the commercial insurance provider, and variation in extension and sales protocols 
may have depressed sales, heterogeneity in demand suggests that other factors also influenced purchases. 
Tracking household purchase patterns across seasons shows considerable variation in when households 
make their first purchase, if they continue to purchase, or if they allow their contract to lapse (Table 2). 
Such behavior suggests dynamic factors play a significant role in insurance demand. In the next section, 
we offer a simple model of index insurance demand and examine the role that basis risk and spatiotemporal 
adverse selection could play in determining demand. 
                                                     
3 
“Divisions” are existing administrative units in Kenya that define the geographic boundaries of the IBLI contract. Division boundaries are suitable 
because they are large enough to reduce moral hazard to a negligible level, small enough to capture a large portion of covariate risk, and are well 
known by pastoralists.  
4
 An index based livestock insurance program in Mongolia, which protects pastoralists from the risk of severe winters known as dzud, seems to 
have been designed off area average herd mortality rates (see Mahul & Skees 2007 for a full description of the IBLI Mongolia project). As of 
writing, the Mongolian program has yet to make its findings public so we are unable to use the similarities between programs to inform this research. 
5
 The aggregation of index divisions into premium regions had been dropped in the newer IBLI products introduced in 2013. 
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2 Demand for Index Based Livestock Insurance 
This section sets up a simple model of household demand for insurance that offers a set of empirically 
testable hypothesis concerning basis risk and spatiotemporal adverse selection. This is meant merely to 
motivate the empirical exploration that is this paper’s primary contribution. As such, we simplify demand 
to be a static problem under uncertainty and ignore dynamic considerations in the interests of brevity. 
Let households maximize their expected utility, which is an increasing and concave von Neumann-
Morgenstern function that satisfies U’>0, U’’<0. Utility is defined over wealth, measured as end-of-period 
herd size expressed in tropical livestock units (TLU).6 Households have an initial livestock endowment, 
TLU0, but their herds are subject to stochastic losses at rate L. Households have the option of purchasing 
livestock insurance at the rate of 𝑝 per TLU insured, where 𝑝 ∈ [0,1].7 Coverage is then the fraction of the 
initial herd insured (𝑡𝑙?̃?). The insurance makes indemnity payments according to an index, which is the 
predicted rate of index-division average livestock losses (𝐼 ∈ [0,1]).8 The utility maximization problem and 
budget constraint can be described as follows, where E is the expectation operator; 
 
(1) max
𝑡𝑙?̃?
𝐸[𝑈(𝑇𝐿𝑈)] 
𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑡𝑜: 𝑇𝐿𝑈 = 𝑇𝐿𝑈0 − 𝐿 ∗ 𝑇𝐿𝑈0 − 𝑡𝑙?̃? ∗ 𝑇𝐿𝑈0 ∗ 𝑝 + 𝑡𝑙?̃? ∗ 𝑇𝐿𝑈0 ∗ 𝐼 
 
Substituting the budget constraint into the utility function and using a second order Taylor expansion 
allows the expected utility maximization problem to be approximated as a function of original livestock 
endowment and adjustments to herd size associated with losses, premium payments and indemnity 
payments.9 To simplify notation we use U=U(𝑇𝐿𝑈0), 𝑈
′ =
𝜕U(𝑇𝐿𝑈0)
𝜕𝑇𝐿𝑈0
, and 𝑈" =
𝜕2U(𝑇𝐿𝑈0)
𝜕𝑇𝐿𝑈0
2 . The necessary 
first order condition becomes 
 
(2) 𝐸 [𝑈′(−𝑝 + 𝐼) + 𝑇𝐿𝑈0 ∗ 𝑈
′′[𝐿𝑝 − 𝐿 ∗ 𝐼 + 𝑡𝑙?̃? ∗ 𝑝2 − 2𝑝 ∗ 𝐼 ∗ 𝑡𝑙?̃? + 𝑡𝑙?̃? ∗ 𝐼2]] = 0 
 
                                                     
6 Tropical livestock units (TLUs) are a conversion rate used to aggregate livestock. The IBLI contracts use the conversion rate of 1 TLU = 0.7 
camels = 1 cattle = 10 sheep or goats as suggested by the FAO Livestock and Environment Toolbox (1999). 
7
 The premium and index are defined as ratio to avoid the need to place a monetary value on livestock. This specification is appropriate in the 
context of livestock insurance in northern Kenya because households often sell off a small animal in order to purchase insurance on remaining 
animals. If the cost of insuring one animal was equivalent to the value of the animal, p=1. 
8 
The index-division refers to the geographic region defined by the insurance product for which a single index determines indemnity payments.  
9
 max
𝑡𝑙?̃?
𝐸 [𝑈(𝑇𝐿𝑈0) + 𝑈
′(𝑇𝐿𝑈0) ∗ (𝑇𝐿𝑈0(− ∗ 𝐿 − 𝑡𝑙?̃? ∗ 𝑝 + 𝑡𝑙?̃? ∗ 𝐼)) +
1
2
𝑈′′(𝑇𝐿𝑈0) (𝑇𝐿𝑈0(−𝐿 − 𝑡𝑙?̃? ∗ 𝑝 + 𝑡𝑙?̃? ∗ 𝐼))
2
] 
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The first order condition can be solved for optimal insurance purchases. We use the representations 
𝐸[𝑥] = ?̅? , 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑥, 𝑦) = the covariance of 𝑥  and  𝑦 , and 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑥)  = variance of  𝑥 , where 𝑥  and 𝑦  are 
representative variables.  
With some algebra, the optimal proportion of original herd to insure can be written as equation (3). 
 
(3) 
𝑡𝑙?̃?∗ =
𝑇𝐿𝑈0 ∗ 𝑈
′′ ∗ [?̅? ∗ (𝐼 ̅ − 𝑝) + 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝐼, 𝐿)] − 𝑈′ ∗ (𝐼 ̅ − 𝑝)
𝑇𝐿𝑈0 ∗ 𝑈′′ ∗ ((𝐼 ̅ − 𝑝)2 + 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝐼))
 
 
The covariance term captures the role of basis risk. If there is no basis risk (𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝐼, 𝐿) = 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝐼)) and 
premiums are actuarially fairly priced (𝐼 ̅ = 𝑝), full coverage is optimal (𝑡𝑙?̃?∗ = 1). Relaxing the premium 
constraint (𝐼 ̅ ≠ 𝑝), optimal coverage is not monotonic in premium rates because changes to premium rates 
not only effect the opportunity cost of premium payments, but also have wealth effects that are ambiguous 
in their impact on demand.10 Clarke (2016) discusses a similar outcome.  
If the basis risk constraint is also relaxed, 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝐼, 𝐿) ≠ 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝐼) and Equation (3) can be rewritten to 
explicitly include the variance of the difference between the index and individual losses (𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝐿 − 𝐼)), a 
definition of basis risk.11  
(3’) 
𝑡𝑙?̃?∗ =
𝑇𝐿𝑈0 ∗ 𝑈
′′ ∗ [?̅? ∗ (𝐼 ̅ − 𝑝) + 1 2⁄ ∗ [𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝐿) + 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝐼) − 𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘]] − 𝑈
′ ∗ (𝐼 ̅ − 𝑝)
𝑇𝐿𝑈0 ∗ 𝑈′′ ∗ ((𝐼 ̅ − 𝑝)2 + 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝐼))
 
 
As the basis risk increases, optimal coverage falls (
𝑑 𝑡𝑙?̃?∗
𝑑𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘
= −
1
2[(𝐼−̅𝑝)2+𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝐼)]
< 0). In addition, the 
reduction in optimal coverage due to basis risk is exacerbated by increasing prices (
𝜕2 𝑡𝑙?̃?∗
𝜕𝑝𝜕𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘
=
−
(𝐼−̅𝑝)
[(𝐼−̅𝑝)2+𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝐼)]2
< 0) when premiums are below the actuarially fair rate (𝐼 ̅ − 𝑝 > 0), while demand 
sensitivity to basis risk falls with premiums when premiums are above their actuarially fair rate ((𝐼 ̅ − 𝑝 <
0)). Intuitively, demand is most sensitive to basis risk when premiums are near their actuarially fair rate 
and becomes less sensitive to basis risk as premiums are increasingly subsidized or loaded. These two 
findings lead to our first core set of hypothesis. 
 
Hypothesis 1: Demand falls as basis risk increases and the sensitivity of demand to basis risk increases as 
premiums approach the actuarially fair rate. 
                                                     
10 
𝜕𝑡𝑙?̃?∗
𝜕(𝐼̅−𝑝)
=
𝑇𝐿𝑈0∗𝑈
′′∗?̅?−𝑈′
𝑇𝐿𝑈0∗𝑈
′′∗((𝐼̅−𝑝)2+𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝐼))
−
2∗𝑇𝐿𝑈0∗𝑈
′′∗𝛿∗{𝑇𝐿𝑈0∗𝑈
′′∗[?̅?∗(𝐼̅−𝑝)+𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝐼,𝐿)]−𝑈′∗(𝐼̅−𝑝)}
[𝑇𝐿𝑈0∗𝑈
′′∗((𝐼̅−𝑝)2+𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝐼))]
2  
11 Basis Risk = 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝐿 − 𝐼) = 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝐿) + 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝐼) − 2𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝐿, 𝐼), so that 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝐿, 𝐼) = 1 2⁄ (𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝐿) + 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝐼) − 𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑖𝑠 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘) 
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2.1 Product Understanding 
In some cases it may be that households do not understand the insurance product well. For example, a 
household might think that the insurance product indemnifies all losses or that indemnity payments are 
always made at the end of every season. In either of the afore mentioned cases, basis risk should play no 
role in the purchase decision, although it could have a large impact on the eventual welfare outcomes of the 
purchase decision. In actuality, there are likely to be households that partially understand the insurance 
contract but have a variety of misconceptions.  
Let an individual’s understanding of the product be summarized by the term 𝐼𝑖 = 𝐼 + 𝑧𝑖, where 𝐼 continues 
to indicate the index that determines indemnity payments, 𝑧𝑖reflects the individual’s misinformation and 𝐼𝑖 
is the index required to produce the indemnity payment that the individual expects to receive. The individual 
believe that the index covaries with losses by  𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝐼𝑖 , 𝐿) , while it actually covaries by  𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝐼, 𝐿) . The 
difference between the two is  𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑧𝑖 , 𝐿).  The optimal purchase is  𝑡𝑙?̃?
∗
=
𝑇𝐿𝑈0∗𝑈
′′∗[𝐿∗(𝐼−̅𝑝)+1 2⁄ ∗[𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝐿)+𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝐼)−𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘]+𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑧𝑖 ,𝐿)]−𝑈
′∗(𝐼−̅𝑝)
𝑇𝐿𝑈0∗𝑈
′′∗((𝐼−̅𝑝)2+𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝐼)+𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑧𝑖)+2∗𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝐼,𝑧𝑖))
. Intuitively, when the factor 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑧𝑖 , 𝐿)>0, the client 
overestimates the accuracy of the index and increases purchases (
𝑑 𝑡𝑙?̃?
∗
𝑑𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑧𝑖,𝐿)
=
1
(𝐼−̅𝑝)2+𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝐼)+𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑧𝑖)+2∗𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝐼,𝑧𝑖)
>
0, ∀ 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝐼, 𝑧𝑖) > 0).  
Misconceptions about the product express themselves as error in the household’s internal estimates of 
basis risk and thus value proposition of the product. The error could be in the direction of reduced or 
increased basis risk, but works towards moderating the relationship between basis risk and demand. This 
relationship leads to our next hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 2: As households’ knowledge of the product improves, they will become more responsive to 
actual basis risk. 
2.2 Spatiotemporal Adverse Selection 
Indemnifying covariate losses, rather than individual losses, eliminates the prospective impact on insurer 
profits of within index-division cross-sectional adverse selection by decoupling indemnity payments from 
individual losses.12 But group-level adverse selection can reemerge if households have information on the 
likelihood of an indemnity payment in the coming season that is not reflected in the premium. For example, 
                                                     
12 For the same reasons, index insurance reduces the incentives for moral hazard. 
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ecological conditions during the sales window may have predictive power as to the likelihood of an 
upcoming drought. In this case, the consumer has a signal (observed ecological conditions) that provides 
information on the probability distribution of coming average losses and thus the likelihood of indemnity 
payments. If that information is not incorporated in the product’s pricing, then we expect demand to respond 
to the increase in risk. Even in cases when the insurer can observe the same information that households 
can, contracts are not always written with variable premium rates. Rather, insurers and reinsurers often set 
prices according to historic averages and are commonly reluctant to change premiums season by season. 
Such intertemporal adverse selection can be incorporated into the above model. Assume that before 
purchasing insurance a household observes a signal that provides information on the likelihood of certain 
end-of-season rangeland conditions that could affect the index for this specific season (𝐸[I∗]) and/or the 
mortality rate at the end of this season (𝐸[𝐿∗]). Let 𝑥∗ be the household’s interpretation of the signal as an 
adjustment to the index 𝐸[𝐼∗] = 𝐸[𝐼] + 𝑥∗  and 𝑦∗be the household’s interpretation of the signal as an 
adjustment to her own expected livestock mortality rate (𝐸[𝐿∗] = 𝐸[𝐿] + 𝑦∗) where 𝑥∗, 𝑦∗ ∈ [−1,1]. We 
can then rewrite 3 as  
 
(3’’) 
𝑡𝑙?̃? =
𝑇𝐿𝑈0𝑈
′′[(?̅? + 𝑦∗)(𝐼 ̅ + 𝑥∗ − 𝑝) + 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝐼, 𝐿)] − 𝑈′(𝐼 ̅ + 𝑥∗ − 𝑝 )
[𝑇𝐿𝑈0𝑈′′((𝐼 ̅ + 𝑥∗ − 𝑝)2 + 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝐼))]
 
 
If the signal pertains only to individual losses (𝑥∗ = 0), then 
𝑑𝑡𝑙?̃?
𝑑𝑦∗
=
𝐼−̅𝑝
((𝐼−̅𝑝)2+𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝐼))
, which has the same 
sign as 𝐼 ̅ − 𝑝 and is identical to a change in long-run livestock losses (?̅?). Households that believe they will 
lose livestock at a greater rate in the following season will increase purchases if premiums are below the 
actuarially fair rate and reduce purchases if premiums are loaded. This leads directly to our third core, 
testable hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 3: Households will respond to signals of increased losses by increasing purchases if premiums 
are below the actuarially fair rate.  
 
By contrast, if the signal pertains only to the expected index, the outcome is similar to changes in 
loadings/subsidies and is not monotonically increasing or decreasing in 𝑥∗.13 As with the effect of premium 
rates on demand, the impact of signals that inform on both losses and index levels is an empirical question. 
                                                     
13 𝜕𝑡𝑙?̃?
∗
𝜕 𝑥∗
=
{𝑇𝐿𝑈0𝑈
′′?̅?−𝑈′}
𝑇𝐿𝑈0𝑈′′((𝐼+̅𝑥∗−𝑝)2+𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝐼))
−
2(𝐼+̅𝑥∗−𝑝)𝑇𝐿𝑈0𝑈
′′{𝑇𝐿𝑈0𝑈
′′[(?̅?+𝑦∗)(𝐼+̅𝑥∗−𝑝)+𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝐼,𝐿)]−𝑈′(𝐼̅+𝑥∗−𝑝 )}
[𝑇𝐿𝑈0𝑈′′((𝐼+̅𝑥∗−𝑝)2+𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝐼))]
2  
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If those signals correctly predict coming conditions, such behavior will be evident in a temporal correlation 
between demand and index value.  
A related, spatially defined form of group-level adverse selection can occur when there is variation in the 
difference between the expected index value and the premium rates or in the index performance between 
distinct geographic regions.14 Differences between expected indemnity and premium rate are likely to be 
common for products with little data with which to estimate the expected indemnity payment. Such 
variation represents, in essence, variations in the subsidy/loading rates between divisions caused by error 
in the provider’s estimated expected index values or perhaps intentionally (e.g., variation in state subsidy 
rates). This type of spatial adverse selection is covered in the above examination of the effects of varying 
the subsidy/loadings.  
A second type of spatial adverse selection can occur if there is variation in the average basis risk between 
index regions due to differences between regions in average risk and in how well the indices perform. That 
is, there may be very little basis risk in one division and a great deal in another even as subsidy/loading 
rates are similar. As was shown above, regions with higher basis risk are expected to have less demand, all 
else being equal. This generates our fourth core hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 4: Division-level variation in basis risk will cause spatial adverse selection apparent in uptake 
patterns.  
 
This simple, static model conforms to our expectations of reduced demand with increased basis risk. It 
predicts that basis risk reduces demand but that it will be less important for those who face extremely high 
or low premium and for those that do not understand the product well. In addition, the model is easily 
extended to include factors that may contribute to spatiotemporal adverse selection. It predicts that we 
should expect to see variation in demand within divisions over time that is correlated with rangeland 
conditions during the sales windows and among divisions based on spatial average differences in risk and 
basis risk. The important point of the model and these analytic findings is that the design features of an 
index insurance product may significantly attenuate demand irrespective of the household characteristics 
extensively studied in the literature to date.  
  
                                                     
14 Within geographic regions there may be clusters of households for whom the index performs especially well or poorly. Although the resulting 
variation in demand would likely have a geographic component, the within-division demand patterns have no impact on provider’s profits and thus 
is not adverse selection. 
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3 Research Design & Data 
Before any public awareness campaign began surrounding the January 2010 launch of the IBLI pilot, the 
IBLI research team began to implement a comprehensive household survey that annually tracks key 
parameters of interest such as herd dynamics, incomes, assets, market and credit access, risk experience 
and behavior, demographics, health and educational outcomes, and more. The initial baseline survey was 
conducted in October of 2009, with households revisited annually thereafter in the same October-November 
period. A total of 924 households were sampled across 16 sub-locations in four divisions (Central, Laisamis, 
Loiyangalani and Maikona) of Marsabit District, selected to represent a broad variation of livestock 
production systems, agro-ecology, market accessibility and ethnic composition.15 The codebook and data 
are publically available at http://livestockinsurance.wordpress.com/publications/. 
A few key elements of the survey design are important to note. Two randomized encouragement 
treatments were implemented to help identify and test key program parameters on demand. In the first, a 
sub-sample was selected to play an educational game based on the pastoral production system and focused 
on how IBLI functions in the face of idiosyncratic and covariate shocks. The game was played in nine of 
the 16 sites among a random selection of half of the sample households in each selected site, and took place 
just before the launch of sales in January 2010 (McPeak, Chantarat & Mude 2010). 
The second encouragement treatment involved a price incentive that introduced exogenous variation in 
premium rates. Discount coupons were randomly distributed to about 60% of the sample before each sales 
season. The coupons were evenly distributed among 10%, 20%, 30%, 40%, 50% and 60% discount levels. 
Upon presentation to insurance sales agents, the coupon entitled the household to the relevant discount on 
premiums for the first 15 TLU insured during that marketing season.16 The coupons expired after the sales 
period immediately following their distribution. Each sales period has a new randomization of discount 
coupons. 
The IBLI team also coordinated survey sites to overlap with the Hunger Safety Net Program (HSNP), a 
new cash transfer program launched by the Government of Kenya in April 2009 that provides regular 
monthly cash transfers to a select group of target households in the northern Kenya ASAL (Hurrell & 
Sabates-Wheeler 2013). The regularity and certainty of this cash transfer may impact household liquidity 
constraints and therefore demand for IBLI. Site selection for IBLI extension encouragement was stratified 
to include both communities targeted by HSNP and other, nearby communities that were not. Figure 1 
                                                     
15 This sample was distributed across the 16 sub-locations on the basis of proportional allocation using Kenya’s 1999 household population census 
statistics. There were only two exceptions to this rule: a minimum sample size of 30 households and maximum of 100 households per sub-location. 
In addition, sampling across each sub-location was also stratified by wealth class based on livestock holdings reported by key informants before 
the selection process. 
16 Of the nine sample households that purchased insurance for more than 15 TLUs, six used a discount coupon for the first 15TLUs. 
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displays the project’s sample sub-locations across Marsabit and illustrates how they vary in terms of the 
noted elements of the study design. Discount coupons were randomly distributed without stratification. 
This paper uses data from four annual survey rounds from between 2009 to 2012. The attrition rate during 
this period was less than 4% in each round. An analysis of attrition is found in Appendix B. There are a 
number of small but statistically significant differences between those households who remained in the 
survey and those who left the survey (Table B4), as well as between those who exited the survey and their 
replacements (Table B5). For a discussion of the causes of attrition see ILRI (2012). We control for these 
characteristics in our analysis to mitigate prospective attrition bias introduced by this possible selection 
process, but the rate of exit is low enough and differences small enough that attrition should be of little 
worry. 
It is important to note that analysis of demand is performed seasonally while the survey data were 
collected annually. Although seasonal data were collected for many variables through recall, some 
characteristics were collected for only one reference point annually. In those cases, the annual values 
collected in October/November are used to represent household characteristics during the previous March-
September LRLD insurance season and the current October-February SRSD season. When estimating 
within household average characturistics, all eight seasonal observations are used to estimate a single 
statistic, which is then treated as a constant over all periods. These details are described in more detail in 
the following section and in Appendix B. 
4 Discussion of Key Variables  
IBLI purchases among those surveyed and within the general population across the Marsabit region were 
greatest in the first sales window and declined in the following periods (Table 1).17 About 45% of the 
balanced panel (N=832) purchased IBLI coverage at least once during the four sales periods covered in 
these data, a relatively high rate of uptake when compared against other index insurance pilots in the 
developing world. Of the 576 purchases observed, the average coverage purchase was for 3.21 TLUs or 24% 
of the average herd size in our sample during the sales windows. Table 2 details the frequencies of observed 
transitions between purchased coverage, existing coverage, and lapsed coverage. Figure 2 illustrates the 
proportion of the sample that purchased IBLI during each sales window and the level of purchase, 
conditional on purchasing.  
Although existing research, which we discuss in detail below, has already provided a framework by 
which to understand many of the household-level factors the influence index insurance demand, we are in 
                                                     
17
 It is important to note that IBLI was not available for purchase during the short rain/short dry (SRSD) 2010 or long rain/long dry (LRLD) 2012 
seasons due to logistical failures in the commercial supply channel. 
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the unique position to empirically examine the role of basis risk and spatiotemporal adverse selection. Both 
are thought to impact demand but have not yet been tested using observations of household losses. At the 
same time, we reinforce previous findings in the literature by including factors that have been found to 
influence demand elsewhere. This section discusses the key variables used in the analysis.  
4.1 Basis Risk 
Our first and second hypothesis state that household demand will respond to basis risk. But, households 
are unlikely to have information about the accuracy (or inaccuracy) of an index product before the product 
has been introduced. In cases where index products are new, such as in the Marsabit IBLI pilot we study, 
individuals must learn about basis risk as index performance is revealed through observations of published 
index values (Karlan et al. 2014).  
To construct our variable of basis risk, we assume that households must learn about it by observing it. In 
addition, we assume that overpayments represent a positive event from the household’s perspective, so that 
our definition of basis risk is a measure of underpayments. We then construct a simple measure of the 
average squared observed underpayments. We assume households expect no basis risk in the first sales 
round. After the first round, households discard their initial naive expectation and update so that their 
posterior is the average squared observed basis error. They continue to do so in each of the following rounds.  
 
(4) 𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑖𝑠 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑙𝑖𝑡 =
1
𝑡 − 1
∑ 𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝐿𝑙𝑖𝑠 − 𝐼𝑙𝑡, 0)
2
𝑡−1
𝑠=1
 
 
Table 3 presents summary statistics for the observed basis risk estimates as well as the seasons used to make 
each estimate.  
There is a risk that observed basis risk is endogenous to our variables of interest. One key concern is 
moral hazard, that households may make riskier herding decisions in this case, in response to insurance 
coverage, leading them to have higher observed basis risk in subsequent rounds. We test for moral hazard 
in what amounts to a difference-in-differences analysis testing for the effect of treatment—purchasing 
insurance—on livestock morality rates. We find that current period IBLI purchases have no effect on 
current period livestock mortality rates (Coef.=-0.02, St. Err.=0.037, analysis not included).18  
                                                     
18 We should note that Jensen, Barrett, and Mude (2016) use an instrumental variable process to find that the cumulative impact of past and current 
IBLI coverage has a negative causal effect on livestock losses by the final survey round in 2012, but they also found that households reduce herd-
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There is also a risk that the index quality is correlated with regional factors that are unobserved by the 
econometrician and the effect demand; access to banks for example. Here it becomes useful to decompose 
basis risk into its design and idiosyncratic components.19 Design risk arises due to differences between 
predicted and actual division-average livestock mortality and can be corrected by adjusting the index. One 
might think of design risk as an indicator of contract adherence, so far as it is the result of a deviation 
between the intended and actual coverage provided by a policy. If there are unobserved characteristics 
shared by households within a division that result in systematically higher or lower design error and that 
effect demand, design error is endogenous to our variables of interest. Regressing observed design error 
onto division dummy variables shows that there are no such time-invariant characteristics (analysis not 
included). Thus, we assume that observed design error is largely exogenous in our analysis.  
The second component of basis risk—idiosyncratic risk—is due to differences between the covariate and 
individual losses and is intrinsically uncorrectable in the index. Figure 3 displays histograms of the 
estimated correlation between individual losses and covariate losses in each division. There is clearly a 
great deal of variation within and between divisions in the individual-covariate loss correlation. Indeed, 
13.3% of households have a non-positive correlation, implying that even if IBLI suffered from zero design 
risk, it would be risk-increasing for them despite its insurance label. Although it is reasonable to be cautious 
about the exogeneity of idiosyncratic risk, other work has shown that it mostly random—unexplained by 
community fixed effects, household fixed effects, or a large list of more than 15 socioeconomic household 
characteristics (Jensen, Barrett & Mude 2016a). 
Thus, our basis risk variable can be thought of as the aggregate of observed differences between the 
household’s losses and covariate losses and the difference between covariate losses and the index. The first 
appears to be nearly random while the later does not vary systematically between divisions.  
4.2 Spatiotemporal Adverse Selection 
IBLI is susceptible to intertemporal adverse selection because droughts leading to high livestock 
mortality are often the result of multiple seasons with poor precipitation so that households may rationally 
avoid purchasing insurance if conditions are good at the time of purchase. In addition, pastoralists may have 
signals (e.g., radio, indigenous forecasting methods, mobile applications) that inform them on the coming 
season’s precipitation or weather. We include two variables—Pre-Czndvi and the household’s reported 
                                                     
size through livestock sales so that there is no impact on mortality rates. The analysis here finds that there is no connection between current 
purchases and current mortality rates.  
19 We did not distinguish between design and idiosyncratic risk in Section 2 because their combined effect determines the level of risk that an 
insured individual retains.  
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expectation of rangeland conditions in the coming season—to capture ecological conditions that pastoralists 
may take into consideration while making their purchase decision, which could lead to intertemporal 
adverse selection. 
Pre-Czndvi is a variable used in the IBLI response function to increase the accuracy of the index by 
controling for conditions at the beginning of the season. It is calculated by summing standardized NDVI 
values from the beginning of the previous rainy season until the current sales period. Higher Pre-Czndvi 
values indicate greater relative greenness during the rainy season leading up to the current insurance season. 
Although the index takes Pre-Czndvi into account when estimating livestock mortality, and premiums could 
be adjusted to reflect the level of risk at the beginning of a season, the insurer and reinsurer have chosen 
not to vary premium rates to account for this observed intertemporal variation in livestock mortality risk. 
Pre-Czndvi has a statistically significant and negative relationship with predicted livestock mortality rates 
(column 1, Table 4). Thus, if households observe the relative greenness that is captured by Pre-Czndvi, they 
could use those observations to help predict coming index values and adjust their purchase decisions 
accordingly. 
A set of dummy variables specify the household’s stated expectations for the coming season’s rangeland 
conditions: good, normal, or bad. Expectation of good (bad) rangeland conditions are negatively (positively) 
and statistically significantly correlated with end-of-season index values (predicted livestock mortality rates) 
as is expected if they correctly predicted coming rangeland conditions (column 2, Table 4). Hypothesis 3 
states that as long as premium rates are below the expected indemnity rate, which they are, households 
expecting higher livestock mortality rates will increase purchases but is ambiguous about the impact of that 
expectation if it also suggests higher index values.20  
Households’ expectations of rangeland conditions may contain the same information that is captured by 
the Pre-Czndvi variable or households may be observing additional information that is not captured by the 
remotely sensed NDVI. Regressing predicted livestock mortality onto both Pre-Czndvi and households’ 
expectations of coming conditions provides strong evidence that the households have additional 
information that is not captured by Pre-Czndvi. The implication is the although IBLI providers could reduce 
the potential for intertemporal adverse selection associated with initial rangeland conditions by adjusting 
premium rates according to Pre-Czndvi, they would continue to face risk of intertemporal adverse selection 
arising from accurate private information held by their potential consumers. According to Hypothesis 3, 
increases in Pre-Czndvi and the expectation of good rangeland conditions should be associated with reduced 
demand for IBLI.  
                                                     
20
 The effective seasonal subsidies beyond actuarially fair rate (E[indemnity payment rate]-seasonal premium rate) for the periods examined were 
are as follows: Central/Gadamoji 0.0249, Laisamis 0.0171, Loiyangalgani 0.0148, and Maikona 0.017 
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We also test for spatially defined adverse selection, which could emerge due to variation in the 
subsidy/loading rate in policies or from variation in division average quality of the policies. Variation in 
subsidy/loading rate results from the aggregation of index divisions into larger premium regions so that 
lower risk divisions are implicitly subsidizing the premium rates of higher risk division in the same 
premium region. Division-average livestock mortality rate is used to capture division-level differences in 
risk, and thus actuarially fair premium rates of a perfect index product. Division average observed levels of 
basis risk are used to test for the effects of variation in product quality. According to Hypothesis 4, we 
expect demand for IBLI to increase with division average livestock mortality rates and to decrease with 
basis risk. 
4.3 Additional Key Variables 
Within the standard model of insurance, exposure to risk coupled with risk aversion is the fundamental 
reason for insurance demand. At any level of positive exposure to risk, the benefits of indemnified losses 
increase with level of risk aversion. But the impact of risk aversion on demand is somewhat ambiguous 
when market imperfections, such as basis risk or premium loadings, are present. Most empirical studies of 
index insurance demand assume a monotonic relationship between risk aversion and demand, often finding 
that increased risk aversion is associated with decreased demand (i.e., Giné, Townsend & Vickery 2008; 
Cole et al. 2013). This negative correlation between risk aversion and demand for insurance has been 
interpreted as evidence that demand for index insurance in developing countries is more similar to 
technology experimentation/adoption than to neoclassical models of insurance demand. Hill, Robles, and 
Ceballos (2013) allow for a nonlinear relationship, specifically testing for hump-shaped demand across risk 
aversion as predicted by Clarke (2016), but find no significant difference in demand across the domain of 
observed risk aversion. In a setup similar to that used by Hill, Robles, and Ceballos (2013), we allow for a 
non-linear relationship between risk aversion and demand as predicted by (Clarke 2016). 
Whether households place more importance on absolute or relative risk is an empirical question that has 
not yet been addressed in the context of index insurance. To determine which is more important, we include 
total herd size and ratio of income generated from livestock and livestock related activities. Total herd size 
provides an absolute measure of exposure to asset risk associated with IBLI insurable assets, while the ratio 
of income that is generated from livestock and livestock related activities approximates the relative income 
risk associated with livestock mortality. We also include the variance of a household’s livestock mortality 
rate during the three seasons before IBLI was introduced as an exogenous control for historic risk. 
Theory and empirical evidence are also ambiguous as to how wealth should affect demand for insurance 
when prices are actuarially unfavorable. Clarke (2016) shows that the relationship between wealth and 
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demand is not monotonic for most reasonable utility functions in such environments. Empirical studies 
offer contradictory evidence, finding that demand increases (Cole et al. 2013; Mobarak & Rosenzweig 
2012) or decreases (McIntosh, Sarris, & Papadopoulos 2013) with variables associated with wealth. The 
empirical literature on poverty traps, which have been shown to exist among east African pastoralists 
(Lybbert et al. 2004, Barrett et al. 2006, Santos and Barrett 2011), indicates that demand may be non-linear 
in wealth, changing dramatically across certain asset thresholds as households try to avoid or to break free 
of a low asset dynamic equilibrium (Chantarat et al. 2014; Janzen, Carter & Ikegami 2012; Lybbert, Just, 
& Barrett 2013). We summarize household wealth with an asset index generated through factor analysis of 
an extensive list of household construction materials, productive assets excluding livestock, and other 
durables (Appendix B).  
Lack of liquidity is often found to constrain demand. Mobarak and Rosenzweig (2012) found that lack 
of cash was the primary reason given by Indian farmers for not purchasing an available index insurance 
product. Although liquidity is likely correlated with wealth, it can constrain demand at any wealth level 
(Cole et al. 2013). In order to capture liquidity, we calculate the sum of cash savings on hand or placed 
within any of several formal and informal savings arrangements. A household’s savings are liquid and 
provide a lower bound estimate of access to liquid capital. We also include an estimate of monthly income 
and participation in the Hunger Safety Net Program (HSNP), an unconditional cash transfer program that 
was launched in the Marsabit region in 2009. 21 Although HSNP participation was not random within 
communities, we are able to partially identify the impact of transfers on demand by controlling for the 
known and corroborated household selection criteria, which are continuous variables with exogenous 
cutoffs, and HSNP community selection.22  
Understanding the IBLI contract is critical for informed demand. Although the IBLI survey does include 
a simple test of accuracy of IBLI knowledge, that evaluation could not be collected before the first sales 
period and is likely endogenous to the decision to purchase an IBLI policy.  
As a proxy for IBLI knowledge, we include a dummy for participation in the randomized education game 
described in the research design section. Balance tables are found in Appendix C. Participation in the game 
had a strongly positive and significant impact on performance on the IBLI knowledge test (Table 5). There 
is some prospect that game participation leads to purchasing through a mechanism other than knowledge 
(e.g., trust, a sense of obligation) so that the above test reported in Table 5 captures an increase in knowledge 
                                                     
21
 HSNP provides transfers every two months to eligible households for at least two years. The bimonthly transfers started at 2,150Ksh in 2009 
(about USD25) and increased to 3,000Ksh in 2011 and then increased again in 2012 to 3,500Ksh in order to help households cope with a severe 
drought. 3,500Ksh could have purchased insurance for about 7 cattle in the lower Marsabit region at that time. There was no retargeting of or 
graduation from HSNP, which could have led to perverse incentives not to purchase IBLI if insurance has a beneficial impact on wealth. 
22 For more details on the HSNP program logistics go to http://www.hsnp.or.ke/ while analysis of impacts can be found in Hurrell & Sabates-
Wheeler (2013) and Jensen, Barrett and Mude (2016b). 
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due to purchase rather than due to the educational component of the game. This is tested by restricting the 
analysis to only those households who never purchase IBLI. As reflected in the second row of Table 5, 
among those who never purchase IBLI, participation in the game increased average IBLI knowledge test 
scores by over 21% (p-value<0.001), providing strong evidence that randomized participation in the 
extension game directly leads to greater IBLI knowledge.  
Access to informal insurance schemes can be an important factor in demand for formal insurance. 
Mobarak and Rosenzweig (2012) show that informal risk pools that insure against idiosyncratic shocks 
complement index insurance with basis risk while informal schemes that protect against covariate shocks 
act as a substitute. In the pastoral societies of east Africa, informal risk sharing through livestock transfers 
and informal credit appears to be modest at best (Lybbert et al. 2004; Santos & Barrett 2011) and not timed 
so as to reduce the impact of shocks or to protect assets (McPeak 2006). But, because informal risk sharing 
is extremely relevant to this work and has empirically been found to impact demand for index insurance in 
India (Mobarak & Rosenzweig 2012), we include the number of informal groups that the household 
participates in as a coarse indicator of potential access to risk pooling.23  
Price surely matters to insurance uptake (Cole et al. 2013, Giné, Townsend & Vickery 2008, Karlan et 
al. 2014). The effective premium rate is calculated as the natural log of the premium rate after accounting 
for randomly distributed discount coupons.  
Appendix B describes how each variable is constructed and which are lagged to avoid capturing changes 
due to paying the premium or due to behavior responses to having IBLI coverage. Table B2 provides 
summary statistics, distinguishing between those households who never purchased IBLI over the four sales 
windows and those who purchased at least once. Differences in unconditional means between the two 
groups show that the groups are mostly similar except for in those variables directly associated with 
purchases. 
5 Econometric strategy 
We seek to identify the factors that influence demand for IBLI. Insurance demand is best modeled as a 
two stage selection process. Propensity to purchase is first determined as the household decides whether or 
not to buy IBLI. Those households who choose to purchase then decide how much to buy. Let ℎ𝑖𝑡
∗  and 𝑦𝑖𝑡
∗  
be latent variables that describe the categorical desire to purchase insurance and the continuous, optimal 
level of purchase, respectively. If ℎ𝑖𝑡
∗ > 0 we observe the positive level of purchase 𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝑦𝑖𝑡
∗  , and if ℎ𝑖𝑡
∗ ≤
0, we observe 𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 0. We write the process as a function of time invariant individual characteristics (𝑐𝑖, 𝑑𝑖) 
                                                     
23 Although ethnic group is also likely to be important in determining access to informal insurance, collinearity between ethnicity and location 
makes that aspect difficult to examine while also examining other variables that are correlated with location, such as the expected subsidy level and 
HSNP participation. 
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including a constant term, time varying individual and division characteristics (𝑥𝑖𝑡 , 𝑧𝑖𝑡), and error terms 
(𝑢𝑖𝑡, 𝑣𝑖𝑡) as follows. 
 
(5) 𝑦𝑖𝑡
∗ = 𝑐𝑖
′𝜂 + 𝑥𝑖𝑡
′ 𝛽 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 
 ℎ𝑖𝑡
∗ = 𝑑𝑖
′𝜂 + 𝑧𝑖𝑡
′ 𝛾 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡 
 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = {
0 𝑖𝑓 ℎ𝑖𝑡
∗ ≤ 0
𝑐𝑖
′𝜂 + 𝑥𝑖𝑡
′ 𝛽 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 𝑖𝑓 ℎ𝑖𝑡
∗ > 0
} 
 
If the same process is used to determine the desire to purchase insurance and the level of purchase, then 
𝑦𝑖𝑡
∗ ≡ ℎ𝑖𝑡
∗  and the model reduces to Tobin’s (1958) model for censored data. In the case of IBLI (and for 
many other cases) there is reason to believe that the two processes may differ. For example, the probability 
of purchasing any IBLI coverage is likely correlated with the distance that the purchaser must travel to 
make the purchase. There is little reason to think that the same distance variable would affect the level of 
purchase. If demand is a two stage process but the two decisions are independent (conditional on observed 
covariates), each stage can be estimated separately and consistently using a double hurdle model (Cragg 
1971).  
In this context, the two decisions most likely fall somewhere between Tobin’s assumption that they are 
identical and Cragg’s assumption that they are independent. That is, 𝑢𝑖𝑡 and 𝑣𝑖𝑡are not identical but they 
are correlated so that both the single model and independent models result in biased estimates of  𝛽 . 
Heckman (1979) suggests that such bias is due to a missing variable that accounts for selection. To control 
for selection, Heckman proposed including the ratio of the predicted likelihood of selection to the 
cumulative probability of selection (the inverse Mills ratio). The inverse Mills ratio is estimated by first 
using a probit model to estimate Pr(𝑠𝑖𝑡 = 1|𝑑𝑖,𝑧𝑖𝑡) = Φ(𝑑𝑖,𝑧𝑖𝑡, 𝜂, 𝛾) , where 𝑠𝑖𝑡 = {
0 𝑖𝑓 ℎ𝑖𝑡
∗ ≤ 0
1 𝑖𝑓 ℎ𝑖𝑡
∗ > 0
} and 
Φ(𝑑𝑖,𝑧𝑖𝑡 , 𝜂, 𝛾) is the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal distribution. The estimates are 
then used to calculate the inverse Mills ratio ?̂?𝑖𝑡 =
𝜙(𝑑𝑖,𝑧𝑖𝑡,?̂?,?̂?)
Φ(𝑑𝑖,𝑧𝑖𝑡,?̂?,?̂?)
 , where 𝜙(𝑑𝑖,𝑧𝑖𝑡 , ?̂?, 𝛾) is the standard normal 
density function. 
Accounting for unobserved household level fixed effects is then a matter of applying panel data 
estimation methods to Heckman’s framework. For short panels, the standard fixed effects approaches suffer 
from the incidental parameters problem when applied to probit models.24 But, if the data generating process 
is best described by the fixed effects model, pooled and random effects models will also be biased. Greene 
                                                     
24
 Because the probit model is non-linear the parameters must be estimated using within household observations, of which we have a maximum 
of four.  
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(2004) compares the magnitude of the bias introduced by estimating pooled, random effects, and fixed 
effects probit parameters for data generated by a probit process with fixed effects. At T=3 and T=5, Greene 
finds the random effects estimates are the most biased, and that the bias associated with the pooled and 
fixed effects models are similar in magnitude. In addition, standard errors are likely to be underestimated 
in the fixed effect model.  
For our primary analysis, we use a variation of pooled estimates developed by Wooldridge (1995), which 
builds off of earlier work by Mundlak (1978) and Chamberlain (1980), to allow for within household time 
invariant factors, but assumes that those factors are reflected in observed within-household mean 
characteristics (?̅?𝑖
𝐹𝐸) and assumes independence conditional on those means. In addition the errors are 
assumed to be distributed normally. 
 
(6) 𝑐𝑖 = ?̅?𝑖
𝐹𝐸′𝛾1 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡 
𝑐 ,  𝑒𝑖𝑡
𝑐 |?̅?𝑖
𝐹𝐸~𝑁(0, 𝜎𝑒
2) 
 𝑑𝑖 = ?̅?𝑖
𝐹𝐸′𝛿1 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡 
𝑑 ,  𝑒𝑖𝑡
𝑑|?̅?𝑖
𝐹𝐸~𝑁(0, 𝜎𝑒
2) 
 
?̅?𝑖
𝐹𝐸 =
1
𝑇
∑ 𝑥𝑖𝑡
𝐹𝐸
𝑇
,  𝑥𝑖𝑡
𝐹𝐸 ⊆ 𝑥𝑖𝑡 , 𝑧𝑖𝑡 
 
As with the Heckman selection process described above, a probit model is used to estimate the inverse 
Mills ratio, but in this case the estimate is a function of household average characteristics and period specific 
characteristics ?̂?𝑖𝑡 =
𝜙(?̅?𝑖
𝐹𝐸′ ,𝑧𝑖𝑡,?̂?1,?̂?,?̂?)
Φ(?̅?𝑖
𝐹𝐸′ ,𝑧𝑖𝑡,?̂?1,?̂?,?̂?)
.  
 Within-household mean characteristics are estimated using all eight seasonal observations while the 
regression parameters (𝛿1, ?̂?, 𝛾, ?̂?) are only estimated during the four seasons in which there were sales. For 
those variables that appear in our estimates twice, as a household mean and a period specific observation, 
we use the deviation from the mean as the period-specific observation to facilitate interpreting the estimates.  
We report the pooled and the conditionally independent fixed effects estimates, while relying primarily 
on the latter as the preferred estimates. If the data generating process does include unobserved individual 
effects that are correlated with our outcome variables and the covariates, our pooled estimates are likely to 
be biased but perform better than either random or fixed effects models (Greene 2004). The conditionally 
independent fixed effects should generate estimates that are at the very least, less biased than those from 
the simple pooled model.  
Both models are estimated using maximum likelihood. Although effective (discounted) price is included 
in both selection and demand equations, a dummy variable indicating that the household randomly received 
a discount coupon is included in the selection equation, but is excluded from the demand equation. The 
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exclusion is valid so long as, conditional on the effective discounted price, the discount coupon serves 
merely as a reminder of product availability and thus affects the dichotomous purchase decision but has no 
effect on the continuous choice of insurance coverage, conditional on purchase. Balance checks on the 
coupons distribution are found in Appendix C.  
6 Results and Discussion 
In the following discussion, we focus on the estimates generated from the conditional fixed effects model. 
The coefficient estimates and average marginal effects (AME) of the full model are reported in Table 6 and 
Table 7, respectively.25 The average marginal effects are then used to test the four hypothesis. Because the 
hypothesis are developed with respect to demand broadly, and do not distinguish between the binary 
purchase decision and the level of purchase, the relevant results from the selection and coverage estimates 
are presented side-by-side for each hypothesis test. The randomized discount coupon dummy, which is used 
to identify the selection model, has a strong positive and statistically significant (coef.= 0.284, st. err.=0.083, 
Table 6) impact on the likelihood of purchasing IBLI.  
6.1 General findings 
Before testing our hypothesizes, we begin with a short discussion of the relationships between household 
characteristics and demand, which help to contextualize the somewhat abstract analysis of basis risk and 
adverse selection.  
Referring back to our model of household demand for insurance, we could not analytically sign many of 
the relationships between household financial characteristics and demand because of the ambiguity of the 
wealth effect on demand. Empirically we also find mixed responses. HSNP transfers, which reflect an 
increase to cash income, are associated with an increase in the demand for IBLI. Considering that HSNP 
transfers are targeted at the poor, it seems reasonable to assume that the cash transfers are helping overcome 
a liquidity constraint that is limiting uptake among the HSNP target population. At the same time, savings, 
which are also a form of liquidity, are negatively associated with uptake. The apparent contradiction may 
reflect a substitution effect between two financial tools—saving and insurance—or a relationship between 
HSNP targeting and access to savings mechanisms. We are unable to disentangle the two here, but HSNP 
participants are less likely to have savings than are non-HSNP participants (difference=8.0%, Pearson 
                                                     
25 The parameter estimates for the pooled model are included in Appendix D as a robustness check. There are few differences in the parameter 
estimates. Importantly, none of the coefficient estimates used to test our hypothesis changes sign and significance is consistent between the two 
models in almost every case, and there is no evidence of an increase in precision, which would be indicative that the household average 
characteristics are superfluous. 
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𝜒2(1) = 53.17). The implication is that HSNP participants are less likely to have cash savings than non-
HSNP participants, and that HSNP transfers are associated with increased IBLI demand while savings are 
associated with a decrease in demand for IBLI.  
Households with consistently high participation in social groups have a greater propensity to purchase 
IBLI. Although participating in social groups could be endogenous to purchasing IBLI, the potential 
endogeneity is minimized because the household’s average participation includes three seasons before the 
first sales season. Other plausible explanations for the positive relationship between social group 
participation and IBLI uptake include the complementarities between index insurance and informal 
idiosyncratic risk pooling described by Mobarak and Rosenzweig (2012) and learning through social 
networks (Cai, de Janvry & Sadoulet 2011).  
There is some indication that demand for IBLI is highest among those with the least amount of risk 
aversion, and that demand falls as risk aversion increases. Although the coefficient estimates are too 
imprecise to draw conclusions about the role of risk aversion in demand for IBLI, they are broadly 
supportive of the literature that frames index insurance uptake a technology uptake. This framing is also 
supported by the generally low rates of coverage purchased by those that do purchase IBLI. For example, 
the median coverage rate (TLUs insured/TLUs owned) conditional on IBLI purchase is only about 0.29 in 
the survey data.  
Perhaps, what is most surprising is how unrelated demand and household characteristics are. There are 
no clear strong monotonic relationships between demand for IBLI and gender, age of the household head, 
nor do education, income, asset wealth, or ratio of income from livestock, an indicator of the relative risk 
that drought could pose the household. Herd size, which one might assume would be the key driver of 
insurance demand, is only statistically significant in one case (lagged herd size on level of coverage 
purchased) and even there the AME is quite small (AME=0.009, Table 7). Our belief is that the following 
analysis will provide empirical evidence that the factors identified analytically in Section 2 are able to 
explain much of the remaining unexplained variation in demand. 
6.2 Hypothesis Testing 
Hypothesis 1: Demand falls as basis risk increases and the sensitivity of demand to basis risk increases as 
premiums approach the actuarially fair rate. 
Consistent with Hypothesis 1, basis risk has a significant and negative AME on demand, both in uptake 
(AME=-0.193, St. Err.= 0.116, Table 7) and coverage purchased (AME=-0.793, St. Err.= 0.428, Table 7), 
conditional on purchasing. The size of the change appears quite large, but the mean of basis risk is only 
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0.044 and the [minimum, maximum] is [0.00, 0.635]. For example, a rough approximation indicates that 
increasing basis risk from the mean to the mean plus one standard deviation (0.11) reduces the likelihood 
of purchase by 2.1 points and coverage by about 0.1 TLU.  
Basis risk is interacted with log of the subsidy rate, which is a monotonic transformation of the premium 
distance from the actuarially fair rate—the variable of interest for Hypothesis 1—because the rate charged 
is always below the actuarially fair rate. Predictably, premium subsidy rates alone have a strong positive 
impact on both likelihood of purchasing IBLI coverage and the amount of coverage purchased. At the mean 
basis risk, the price elasticity of coverage is 1.18, elastic, but becomes inelastic as basis risk increases.26 
Hypothesis 1 states basis risk should become more important as the subsidies fall and the price 
approaches the actuarially fair rate. Contradicting Hypothesis 1, sensitivity to basis risk seems to increase 
with basis risk, although the change is not statistically significant within one standard deviation of the mean 
subsidy rate (Table 8). Explicitly, increasing basis risk always reduces demand, but there is weak evidence 
that it does so at a greater rate for those with higher subsidies, which contradicts the second part of 
Hypothesis 1. We have no evidence as to why this might be, but one plausible theory is that potential clients 
under-estimate the (actuarially fair) value of the product to the extent that they treat it as though the premium 
rates are above the actuarially fair rate. 
Hypothesis 2: As households’ knowledge of the product improves, they will become more responsive to 
actual basis risk. 
The impact of IBLI knowledge on demand response to basis risk is tested by interacting basis risk with 
an indicator that the head of household played the randomized education game described in the research 
design section. Participation in the game had a strongly positive and significant impact on performance on 
the IBLI knowledge test (Row 1, Table 5), even among those that never purchased IBLI (Row 2, Table 5). 
Note as well that playing the game directly increases IBLI uptake (Coef.=0.302, St. Err.=0.116, Table 6) 
and level of purchase (Coef.=0.216, St. Err.=0.0939, Table 6). 
The exogenous increase to IBLI knowledge, by way of participation in the randomized educational game, 
increases sensitivity to basis risk considerably (Table 9). In fact, among those that were not randomly 
selected to play the educational game, there seems to be very little relationship between basis risk and 
demand. These findings indicate that (A) the educational extension games were an effective form of 
extension and (B), there is a grave need for further investments in educational campaigns.27 
                                                     
26 Mean basis risk is equal to 0.044, the coefficient estimate for the natural log of the subsidy rate is1.25, and the coefficient estimate for the natural 
log of the subsidy rate interacted with basis risk is equal to -1.64. 
27 A further analysis, which is not included here, reveals that the impacts of the one-shot educational game on responsiveness to basis risk do not 
dissipate during the four seasons examined in this analysis.  
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Hypothesis 3: Households will respond to signals of increased losses by increasing purchases if premiums 
are below the actuarially fair rate.  
Households’ reported expectation of next season’s rangeland conditions and Pre-Czndvi (a division level 
proxy for rangeland conditions at the time of sale) are used to test for inter-temporal adverse selection. 
There is evidence that households adjust demand in response to signals of the coming conditions, but the 
adjustments are not entirely consistent with each other or with our hypothesis. The sign on the coefficient 
estimates associated with an expectation that conditions will be good is negative, which is consistent with 
our hypothesis but the estimates are not statistically significant. An expectation that the rangeland will be 
worse than normal during the coming (insurance) season are statistically significant and negatively related 
to IBLI demand.28 While, at the same time, households are less (more) likely to purchase coverage during 
seasons in which the NDVI index indicates that conditions were good (poor) during the purchase window, 
and those that do, purchase less (more) coverage. Although the magnitude of the average marginal effect is 
small, Pre-Czndvi is distributed around zero and ranges from -21.52 to 14.92, so that its effects on coverage 
are considerable in seasons when conditions are extremely poor or favorable. For example, as households 
entered the SRSD11 drought season, which triggered indemnity payments in all IBLI regions, the average 
Pre-Czndvi value was -17.48, which would be associated with a three point increase in likelihood of 
purchasing insurance (AME=-0.0018, Table 7) and a 5% increase in coverage purchased, conditional on 
purchasing (AME=-0.0087, Table 7). 
The contradiction between the role of expected conditions and pre-CZNDVI could be reflecting a 
distinction between the rangelands that a household commonly uses, and thus respond on in the survey, and 
their index region. Such a distinction is realistic. For example, many of the communities in the data have 
designated wet and dry season pastures, which would usually represent a region that is negligible when 
compared to the entire index region. Add to that, that households often hold some of their animals with 
relatives in far off regions, which could be in a completely different index region, and it is not surprising 
that a pastoralist might report on rangelands that are not bounded by boundaries of their index region.  
Another, perhaps clearer, way to interpret these findings are that pastoralists are more likely to insure 
when there are signals of covariate threats (division average patterns of forage availability are worse than 
normal) and less likely to purchase insurance when they perceive an increased threat of an idiosyncratic 
shock to their forage availability.  
For insurance providers, such intertemporal adverse selection is of grave concern. Here, one of the very 
index factors that directly leads to indemnity payments is also related to insurance uptake. Furthermore, 
                                                     
28 Note as well that households with a generally pessimistic opinion of conditions, in that they expect poor conditions more often than normal, 
purchase more coverage (AME=0.458, St. Err.=0.175, Table 7).  
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there is a strong argument that division-scale rangeland conditions are exogenous to individual actions and 
capture conditions just as potential clients are making their purchase decision, which points towards a causal 
relationship In this case, pre-CZNDVI has a causal impact on demand for IBLI and on indemnity payments 
and that relationship increases demand in periods in which indemnities are made.  
Hypothesis 4: Division-level variation in basis risk will cause spatial adverse selection apparent in uptake 
patterns. 
Confirming Hypothesis 4, there is strong evidence of spatial adverse selection. The AME of division-
level basis risk is negative for both uptake (AME=-1.20, St. Err.=0.367, Table 7) and coverage (AME=-
3.59, St. Err.=1.596, Table 7). Those divisions with greater basis risk consistently face lower demand. There 
is also some evidence that demand is higher in divisions with higher livestock mortality rates on average. 
The division average basis risk variable is interacted with the IBLI extension game in order to allow its 
effects to vary across understanding of IBLI. Similar to the findings on household-level basis risk, those 
that participated in the IBLI extension game respond much more strongly than those that did not (Table 10). 
The implication of increased sensitivity to basis risk associated understanding of the product for spatial 
adverse selection is that as clients become more familiar with a product, they respond more strongly to 
product quality. In cases that the quality varies across index regions, index insurance providers will see an 
increase in heterogeneity in demand across space as prospective clients become more product savvy.  
As discussed earlier, spatial heterogeneity in demand across index regions is only of an immediate 
concern to insurance providers that lump index regions together in order to homogenize premium rates and 
simplify insurance contracts, as they did with IBLI. For those with development or humanitarian objectives, 
a potential concern is that, if there is a negative correlation between poverty and high-quality data 
availability with which to develop high-quality insurance products, the correlation could lead to a market 
equilibrium with low quality products and low demand for insurance in marginal regions with high poverty 
rates. Such welfare reducing market equilibrium are discussed by Clarke and Wren-Lewis (2013). A second 
implication is that the public sector should continue to be active in extension and product education efforts 
as the private sector may have a conflict of interest.  
6.3 Shapley’s R2 Decomposition 
A Shapley’s R2 decomposition sheds some light on which factors contribute most to explaining variation 
in IBLI uptake and level of purchase. To do so, we use a two-stage model, rather than the maximum 
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likelihood model used in the main analysis.29 The goodness of fit measures for each stage are decomposed 
according to pre-specified groups of variables using an adjusted version of the user-written STATA 
command shapely2 (Juárez 2014), which builds off earlier work by Kolenikov (2000) and theory by 
Shapley (1953) and Shorrocks (2013).30 The Shapley R2 decompositions should be interpreted as the ratio 
of the model’s goodness of fit (R2 or Pseudo R2) that can be attributed to each group of variables.  
Table 11 presents the Shapley R2 decompositions by group. Household characteristics account for under 
half of the variation in demand and price accounts for between 10% and 14% of the variation. Basis risk 
and knowledge are more important for uptake than demand, accounting for 9% and 5% of the observed 
variation, respectively. Both intertemporal and spatial adverse selection are also more important for a 
households’ uptake decision than for their coverage decision. In addition, there is very strong evidence that 
the selection process is very important to consider when examining index insurance demand. The inverse 
Mills ratio accounts for over 30% of the fit our second stage of our two-stage model. Altogether, the main 
variables of interest that were used to test our four hypothesis are responsible for 30% and 25% of the 
uptake and coverage decisions that households make, respectively. 
6.4 Concluding Remarks 
The above analysis provides strong empirical evidence that in addition to price and household 
characteristics, index insurance product characteristics such as adverse selection and basis risk play 
economically and statistically significant roles in determining demand. The point estimates from our 
analysis predict the changes in IBLI purchases over time rather well, showing a reduction in uptake after 
the first period and a small upturn in the final period (Figure 4).  
With the model estimates and Shapely values in mind, it is clear that both product and household 
characteristics play an important role in determining demand for index insurance. While little can be done 
to change household characteristics, it may be possible to improve contract design to lessen adverse 
selection and basis risk. For example, IBLI no longer aggregates index divisions into premium regions, 
removing one source of spatial adverse selection. Adjusting premium rates dynamically to account for 
initial season conditions is an additional step that could be taken to reduce adverse selection. Idiosyncratic 
risk, a component of basis risk, limits the potential impact of even a perfect index product, but is in part a 
construct of the index division, which is now being be adjusted to increase the importance of covariate risk. 
                                                     
29 A side-by-side comparison of the pooled two-stage and pooled maximum likelihood estimates, as well as the full Shapley’s R2 decomposition 
are found in Appendix E. Importantly, the coefficient estimates are very similar between the two models. 
30 The variable categories are demographic, financial, price, basis risk and knowledge, intertemporal adverse selection, spatial adverse selection, 
and a category containing either the instrumental variable or the inverse Mills ratio. 
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Reducing design risk is likely to be relatively simple if household-level data are collected and used to 
improve the performance of the index. Finally, improving understanding of the IBLI product through 
extension increases demand for IBLI and redistributes that demand to those with the least basis risk, 
improving the likelihood that the product will successfully cover risk and benefit its clients. The evidence 
from the IBLI pilot in northern Kenya clearly underscore the importance of index insurance design to 
resulting demand patterns for these innovative financial instruments. 
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FIGURES 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Survey Design, Participation in IBLI Game and HSNP Target Sites  
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. IBLI Purchasing Behavior During Each Sales Window 
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Figure 3. Histograms of the Correlation between Individual and Covariate Livestock Mortality Rates 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Figure 4. Unconditional Observed and Predicted Likelihood of Purchasing IBLI (Left) and Level of Purchases, 
Conditional on Being a Purchaser (Right) 
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TABLES 
 
 
     IBLI survey households 
Survey# Sales Window IBLI Coverage Period  Total Contracts Sold 
in Population 
Did Not 
Purchase 
Purchased 
R1 (2009) - -  - - - 
- -  - - - 
R2 (2010) J-F 2010 LRLD10/SRSD10 (N) 1,974 679 245 
  (Mean) & 3.0 - (3.94) 
None - (N) - - - 
   (Mean) & - - - 
R3 (2011) J-f 2011 LRLD11/SRSD11 (N) 595 790 134 
  (Mean) & (2.1) - (3.05) 
A-S 2011  SRSD11/LRLD12 (N) 509 797 127 
   (Mean) & (1.6) - (2.39) 
R4 (2012) None - (N) - - - 
  (Mean) & - - - 
A-S 2012 SRSD12/LRLD13 (N) 216 844 80 
   (Mean) & (1.9) - (2.29) 
Notes: LRLD and SRSD refer to the long rain/long dry and short rain/short dry season respectively. There were no sales during the Aug/Sept 2010 
and Jan/Feb 2011 sales periods due to supply channel failures. Jan/Feb 2010, Jan/Feb 2011 & Aug/Sept 2011 were sold by UAP Insurance. Aug/Sept 
2012 was sold by APA Insurance. #Surveys were collected during October and November of each year. &Mean is the unweighted mean coverage 
purchased in TLUs, conditional on purchasing IBLI.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sales window New1 Replacement2 Augmenting3 Holding4 Reenter5 Lapsed6 Total7 
J-F 2010 225 0 0 0 0 0 225 
J-F 2011 67 60 0 0 0 165 292 
A-S 2011 66 0 31 96 21 144 358 
A-S 2012 19 25 0 0 33 300 377 
Notes: We use the balanced panel of 832 households in this table to track household purchase behavior over time. Therefore, columns do not sum 
to the totals reported in Table 1. 1First time purchasers. 2Replaced a policy about to expire. 3Purchased additional coverage that overlapped with 
existing coverage. 4No purchase but had existing coverage. 5Let policy lapse for at least one season but purchased this season. 6 Past policies have 
lapsed and did not purchased additional coverage. 7Total number of households that have purchased to date.   
Table 1 
Representation of Demand for IBLI in the Survey Sample  
Table 2  
Household IBLI Purchase Patterns Among Survey Households, By Sales Window 
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Sales Seasons  Observed Average Estimated Design Error (X100) 
Design Risk Observations Central/Gadamoji Laisamis Loiyangalani Maikona 
J-F 2010 - 0 0 0 0 
J-F 2010 LRLD 2010 4.69 6.37 7.66 2.61 
A-S 2011 LRLD 2010, SRSD 2010 8.53 6.56 8.16 3.95 
A-S 2012 LRLD 2010, SRSD 2010, LRLD 2011, SRSD11 5.93 4.22 7.67 3.12 
Notes: LRLD and SRSD refer to the long rain/long dry and short rain/short dry season respectively. The observed average estimated design error 
is the mean difference between covariate loss rate and the predicted loss rate (index) during previous seasons with potential IBLI coverage.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable Index Index Index 
Pre-Czndvi -0.0066**  -0.0059*** 
 (0.0024)  (0.0001) 
Expected Rangeland Condition1:    
Good  -0.0382*** -0.0220*** 
  [0.0032] [0.0026] 
Bad  0.0467*** 0.0386*** 
  [0.0041] [0.0037] 
    
Constant 0.0769** 0.1153*** 0.0794*** 
 (0.0262) [0.0018] [0.0016] 
    
Observations 16 3,696 3,696 
R-squared 0.3594 0.0901 0.3648 
Notes: 1The expected conditions variables are a set of dummy variables for expected conditions are: good, normal, or bad. Expected 
conditions=Normal is the omitted category. Standard errors in parentheses. Household clustered and robust standard errors in brackets. *** p<0.01, 
** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
 
 
 
 
 Not game participant Game participant   
IBLI Knowledge: Mean Std. Err. Mean Std. Err. Difference t-test 
Full Sample (N=832) 1.73 0.043 2.12 0.072 0.39 4.65*** 
Never Purchased (N=450) 1.55 0.055 1.88 0.107 0.34 2.82*** 
Notes: The game was played in January 2010. The scores above reflect the number of correct answers to survey questions testing household 
understanding of IBLI contract details. Significance is indicated by: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
  
 
  
Table 3  
The Average Observed Design Error in Each Division at Each Sales Period 
Table 4 
Rangeland Conditions During Each Sales Window as Predictors of Final Index Value  
 
Table 5  
The Impact of the Randomized Extension Game on Understanding of the IBLI Contracts 
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  Uptake  Level (TLU) 
VARIABLES Coefficient Std. Err.  Coefficient Std. Err. 
Household Period-Specific Characteristics:     
Male A 0.0226 (0.0907)  0.0824 (0.0836) 
Age A -0.0080* (0.0048)  -0.0069 (0.0048) 
Age2 A 0.0000 (0.0002)  0.0001 (0.0002) 
Education A 0.0147 (0.0432)  0.0328 (0.0388) 
Dependency Ratio A 0.7795** (0.3335)  0.5702 (0.3535) 
Social Groups A 0.0494 (0.0553)  0.0278 (0.0486) 
Ln(income) A 0.0348 (0.0285)  0.0322 (0.0249) 
Ln(income)2 A  0.0095** (0.0047)  0.0053 (0.0040) 
Ratio income livestock A -0.1600 (0.1404)  -0.2280* (0.1331) 
TLU A 0.0061 (0.0041)  0.0088** (0.0036) 
TLU2 A -0.0002 (0.0001)  -0.0001 (0.0001) 
Asset Index -0.1805* (0.1039)  -0.0510 (0.0801) 
Savings (10TLU) A -0.3485** (0.1717)  -0.1735 (0.1609) 
HSNP A 0.3207* (0.1722)  0.2681* (0.1416) 
HSNP Eligible A 0.1037 (0.1980)  -0.0333 (0.2023) 
Discount Coupon (=1 if recipient)  0.2858*** (0.0883)    
      
Household Averages Characteristics:      
Age -0.0012 (0.0137)  -0.0037 (0.0113) 
Age2 0.0000 (0.0001)  0.0000 (0.0001) 
Education -0.0199* (0.0119)  -0.0106 (0.0107) 
Dependency Ratio -0.3074 (0.2455)  -0.3625 (0.2373) 
Social Groups  0.4786*** (0.0713)  0.3245*** (0.0758) 
Ln(income) -0.0012 (0.1568)  -0.0998 (0.1511) 
Ln(income)2 0.0006 (0.0120)  0.0090 (0.0117) 
Ratio income livestock  0.0241 (0.1719)  -0.0741 (0.1959) 
TLU  -0.0020 (0.0062)  0.0072 (0.0065) 
TLU2 -0.0000 (0.0001)  -0.0002** (0.0001) 
Asset Index 0.0490 (0.0745)  0.1180 (0.0780) 
Savings (10TLU)  0.0470 (0.2528)  -0.3855 (0.2488) 
HSNP -0.1311 (0.1884)  -0.0254 (0.1784) 
HSNP Eligible -0.0783 (0.1941)  -0.0380 (0.1898) 
HSNP Village 0.0673 (0.1201)  -0.0348 (0.1324) 
Moderately Risk Averse -0.0444 (0.0931)  -0.0337 (0.0832) 
Extremely Risk Averse -0.1902* (0.1040)  -0.1105 (0.0924) 
Risk -0.8503* (0.5083)  -0.6441 (0.4690) 
Expected Conditions: Good=1 0.0803 (0.1678)  0.2127 (0.1431) 
Expected Conditions: Bad=1 -0.0136 (0.1898)  0.4579*** (0.1751) 
      
Hypothesis 1: Basis Risk And Price      
Basis Risk -0.9527 (1.2988)  -1.1880 (1.1407) 
Ln (Subsidy) 0.9684*** (0.2881)  1.2544*** (0.2129) 
Basis Risk x Ln (Subsidy) -1.8647 (2.1765)  -1.6360 (1.9513) 
      
Hypothesis 2: Basis Risk And Learning      
Game 0.3024*** (0.1160)  0.2161** (0.0939) 
Basis Risk X Game -2.6114** (1.2046)  -1.4809 (1.0525) 
      
Hypothesis 3: Intertemporal Adverse Selection 
    
Expected Conditions: Good=1 B -0.0825 (0.0979)  -0.1053 (0.0845) 
Expected Conditions: Bad=1 B -0.2477** (0.1035)  -0.2514** (0.0999) 
Pre-CZNDVI -0.0085* (0.0046)  -0.0087* (0.0046) 
      
Hypothesis 4: Spatial Adverse Selection      
Division Average Loss Rate  5.6283** (2.7645)  3.9716 (2.6839) 
Division Average Basis Risk  -4.8524** (1.9611)  -2.4986 (1.8095) 
Division Average Basis Risk X Game -2.2374 (2.5614)  -3.6911* (2.1707) 
      
Observations     3,096 
Wald test of Independent Equations 𝜒2     177.45 
Model Wald 𝜒2     174.49 
Notes: Additional covariates not listed above include time dummies and a constant. A Variable is demeaned and lagged one period. B Variable is 
demeaned. #Omitted variable is Expected conditions: poor. Household clustered and robust standard errors in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, 
* p<0.1 
Table 6  
Coefficient Estimates on Demand for IBLI (Conditional FE Model) 
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  Uptake  Level (TLU) 
VARIABLES AME Std. Err.  AME Std. Err. 
Household Period-Specific Characteristics:     
Male A 0.0049 (0.0197)  0.0824 (0.0836) 
Age A -0.0017* (0.0010)  -0.0068 (0.0049) 
Education A 0.0032 (0.0094)  0.0328 (0.0388) 
Dependency Ratio A 0.1695** (0.0734)  0.5702 (0.3535) 
Social Groups A 0.0107 (0.0120)  0.0278 (0.0486) 
Ln(income) A 0.0085 (0.0066)  0.0360 (0.0269) 
Ratio income livestock A -0.0348 (0.0303)  -0.2280* (0.1331) 
TLU A 0.0014 (0.0009)  0.0090** (0.0037) 
Asset Index A -0.0393* (0.0226)  -0.0510 (0.0801) 
Savings (10TLU) A -0.0758** (0.0374)  -0.1735 (0.1609) 
HSNP A 0.0698* (0.0376)  0.2681* (0.1416) 
HSNP Eligible A 0.0226 (0.0430)  -0.0333 (0.2023) 
Discount Coupon (=1 if recipient)  0.0622*** (0.0194)    
      
Household Averages Characteristics:      
Age 0.0003 (0.0007)  0.0011 (0.0029) 
Education -0.0043* (0.0026)  -0.0106 (0.0107) 
Dependency Ratio -0.0669 (0.0538)  -0.3625 (0.2373) 
Social Groups  0.1041*** (0.0154)  0.3245*** (0.0758) 
Ln(income) 0.0018 (0.0103)  0.0345 (0.0434) 
Ratio income livestock  0.0052 (0.0374)  -0.0741 (0.1959) 
TLU  -0.0006 (0.0010)  0.0012 (0.0044) 
Asset Index 0.0107 (0.0162)  0.1180 (0.0780) 
Savings (10TLU)  0.0102 (0.0550)  -0.3855 (0.2488) 
HSNP -0.0285 (0.0411)  -0.0254 (0.1784) 
HSNP Eligible -0.0170 (0.0422)  -0.0380 (0.1898) 
HSNP Village 0.0146 (0.0262)  -0.0348 (0.1324) 
Moderately Risk Averse -0.0097 (0.0203)  -0.0337 (0.0832) 
Extremely Risk Averse -0.0414* (0.0225)  -0.1105 (0.0924) 
Risk -0.1849* (0.1113)  -0.6441 (0.4690) 
Expected Conditions: Good=1B 0.0175 (0.0365)  0.2127 (0.1431) 
Expected Conditions: Bad=1 B -0.0030 (0.0413)  0.4579*** (0.1751) 
      
Hypothesis 1: Basis Risk And Price      
Basis Risk -0.1933* (0.1155)  -0.7933* (0.4277) 
Ln (Subsidy) 0.1960*** (0.0581)  1.1796*** (0.1887) 
      
Hypothesis 2: Basis Risk And Learning      
Game 0.0283 (0.0187)  -0.0147 (0.0729) 
      
Hypothesis 3: Intertemporal Adverse Selection 
    
Expected Conditions: Good=1 B, C -0.0179 (0.0213)  -0.1053 (0.0845) 
Expected Conditions: Bad=1 B, C -0.0539** (0.0227)  -0.2514** (0.0999) 
Pre-CZNDVI -0.0018* (0.0010)  -0.0087* (0.0046) 
      
Hypothesis 4: Spatial Adverse Selection      
Division Average Loss Rate  1.2242** (0.6057)  3.9716 (2.6839) 
Division Average Basis Risk  -1.2044*** (0.3664)  -3.5889** (1.5961) 
      
Observations     3,096 
Wald Test of Independent Equations 𝜒2    177.45 
Model Wald 𝜒2     174.49 
Notes: Additional covariates not listed above include time dummies and a constant. A Variable is demeaned and lagged one period. B Omitted 
variable is Expected conditions: normal. C Variable is demeaned. Household clustered and robust standard errors in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  
Table 7 
Average Marginal Effects (AME) on Demand for IBLI (Conditional FE Model) 
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Subsidy (Subsidy Rate) 
AME of basis 
risk Std. Err. t-stat P>t [95% Conf. Interval] 
Probit       
 Mean – 1SD (50.1%) -0.0899 (0.1294) -0.6950 0.4870 -0.3435 0.1637 
 Mean (60.3%) -0.1776 (0.1162) -1.5285 0.1264 -0.4053 0.0501 
 Mean + 1SD (72.5%) -0.2861* (0.1602) -1.7862 0.0741 -0.6001 0.0278 
Level 
 
     
 Mean – 1SD (50.1%) -0.4963 (0.5646) -0.8789 0.3794 -1.6030 0.6104 
 Mean (60.3%) -0.7972* (0.4278) -1.8635 0.0624 -1.6358 0.0413 
 Mean + 1SD (72.5%) -1.0982** (0.5523) -1.9886 0.0468 -2.1807 -0.0158 
Notes: The mean within-survey estimated actuarially fair rate is 8.3%. IBLI contracts were marketed at an average rate of 3.9% before any 
discounts were applied. 
 
 
 
 
 
 Played Game AME of basis risk Std. Err. t-stat P>t [95% Conf. Interval] 
Probit       
 No -0.0201 (0.1308) -0.1536 0.8779 -0.2765 0.2363 
 Yes -0.6064** (0.2385) -2.5426 0.0110 -1.0739 -0.1390 
Level 
 
     
 No -0.3549 (0.4853) -0.7314 0.4645 -1.3060 0.5962 
 Yes -1.8390** (0.9150) -2.0097 0.0445 -3.6324 -0.0455 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Played 
Game 
AME of Division-Average Basis 
Risk Std. Err. t-stat P>t [95% Conf. Interval] 
Probit       
 No -1.0395** (0.4167) -2.4944 0.0126 -1.8563 -0.2227 
 Yes -1.5976*** (0.5076) -3.1473 0.0016 -2.5925 -0.6027 
Level 
 
     
 No -2.4986 (1.8095) -1.3808 0.1673 -6.0450 1.0479 
 Yes -6.1897*** (2.0249) -3.0568 0.0022 -10.1584 -2.2209 
 
  
Table 8  
The AME of Basis Risk on Demand Across Premium Discounts 
Table 9 
The Impact of IBLI Education on Demand Sensitivity to Basis Bisk  
Table 10 
 The Relationship between Demand for IBLI, Division-Average Basis Risk, and IBLI Knowledge  
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 IBLI Uptake 
(Probit) 
 
Level of Purchase 
(Conditional on Purchase) 
Household Characteristics:    
Demographics A 29.93  22.68 
Financial B 17.95  14.70 
    
Product Related Characteristics:    
Subsidy C 10.94  13.04 
Basis Risk & Knowledge D 9.13  4.62 
    
Prospective Adverse Selection:    
Intertemporal E 5.31  2.61 
Spatial F 4.78  4.05 
    
Coupon Dummy/IMR 21.95  38.30 
Total 100.00  100.00 
    
(Pseudo R2) [R2] (0.132)  [0.418] 
A Includes: gender, age, age2, education, dependency ratio, social groups, level of risk aversion, HSNP eligibility, HSNP village, and the within 
household means of each of the afore mentioned, where there is within household variation. 
B Includes: ln(income), ln(income)2, ratio income from livestock, TLU, TLU2, asset index, Savings(10TLU), HSNP, and the within household 
means of each of the afore mentioned 
C Includes: ln(subsidy rate). 
D Includes: basis risk, game, basis risk X ln(subsidy rate), basis risk X game.  
E Includes: expected conditions dummies, Pre-Czndvi 
F Includes: division average livestock mortality rate, division-period average basis risk, division-period average basis risk X game.  
Table 11 
Shapley Decomposition of Pseudo R2 and R2 (%) 
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Appendix A: Key Features of Index Based Livestock Insurance (IBLI) Contract 
The risk: 
Index based Livestock Insurance (IBLI) is a product that is designed to protect against drought-related 
livestock mortality. 
 
The index:  
As described in Chantarat et al. (2013), the index in IBLI is the predicted livestock mortality rate. It is 
calculated by using a measure of vegetation coverage that is measured by satellite-based sensors, called the 
Normalized Difference Vegetation Index (NDVI). This vegetation measure is fed into a statistical response 
function that was constructed by relating historic drought related livestock mortality data to various 
transformation of the historic NDVI. The parameters estimated from the historic data are used to predict 
drought related livestock mortality from sequences of observed NDVI values. 
 
Contract strike level: 
The index threshold above which payouts are made is called the strike level. The strike level for IBLI is 
15%. In other words, IBLI will compensate if predicted livestock mortality is above 15%. 
 
Geographical coverage of contract and the index:  
Marsabit District is covered by two separate contracts. There is an Upper Marsabit contract consisting of 
Maikona and North Horr divisions, and a Lower Marsabit contract consisting of Central, Gadamoji, 
Laisamis, and Loiyangalani divisions (Figure A1). 
The index – predicted livestock mortality – computed and reported at the division level. The five 
division—North Horr, Maikona, Loiyangalani, Laisamis and Central—could each have a different index 
level. Because insurance payments are made according to the index level, this means that IBLI may make 
different indemnity payments across divisions. Every insurance policy holder within the same division, 
however, will receive the same rate of insurance payment, provided that the index is above the strike. 
 
 
Upper Marsabit Contract:  
Lower Marsabit Contract: 
  
 
Figure A1. IBLI Geographical Coverage 
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Contract premium rates and indemnity payments: 
Premiums are different between the two contract regions to reflect their differences in historical risk of 
livestock mortality. Premium rates are reported as a percent of the value of insured livestock. From first 
initial sales in January of 2010 through 2012, the unsubsidized and loaded premiums were 5.4% and 9.2% 
in the lower and upper IBLI contract regions, respectively. At that time, those premiums were subsidized 
by about 40% so that pastoralists in the lower and upper regions purchased IBLI coverage at a rate of 5.5% 
and 3.25%, respectively.  
The standard livestock types for a pastoral herd in Kenya are covered: camels, cattle, sheep and goats. 
To arrive at a value for the insured herd, the four livestock types are transformed into a standard livestock 
unit known as a Tropical Livestock Unit (TLU). TLU is calculated as follows: 1 Camel = 1.4 TLU, 1 Cattle 
= 1 TLU and 1 goat/sheep = 0.1 TLU. Once total TLU are calculated, the value of the total herd is computed 
based on average historical prices for livestock across Marsabit, at a set price per TLU insured of Ksh 
15,000. The premiums are then applied to the insured value to arrive at the amount one pays for IBLI 
coverage for the year. 
There are no indemnity payments if the index falls below the strike (15%). If the index exceeds the strike, 
indemnity payments are calculated as the product of the value of the insured herd and difference between 
the predicted livestock mortality and the deductible. 
 
Time Coverage of IBLI: 
The figure below presents the time coverage of the IBLI. The annual contract begins at the close of a 
marketing window, either March 1st or October 1st. Contracts are sold only within a two month (January-
February of August-September) time frame as the rainy season that typically begins right after that window 
may give the potential buyer information about the likely range conditions of the season to come that would 
affect purchase decisions. This annual contract has two potential payout periods: at the end of the long dry 
season based on the October 1st index reading and at the end of the short dry season based on the March 1st 
index readings. At these points of time, if the index exceeds 15%, active policy holders receive an indemnity 
payment. 
 
 
 
Figure A2. Temporal Structure of IBLI Contract 
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Appendix B. Description of the Key Variables and Analysis of Attrition 
The data used in this research was collected by the IBLI field team in Marsabit, Kenya. The data was 
collected in four annual survey rounds in October and November. The 16 sublocations included in the 
survey were selected intentionally to represent a wide range of market and ecological conditions. 
Proportional sampling was done at the community level and stratified random sampling was done within 
communities. The survey tool included a wide variety of questions on household’s demographic and 
economic characteristics. It emphasizes livestock related data, such as herd composition and detailed 
monthly livestock intake and offtake. The variable construction and summary statistics are found in Tables 
B1 and B2.  
 
Variable Data 
Frequency 
Description 
Male Annual Sex of the head of household (1=male). 
Age of Head  Annual Age of the head of household (years). 
Education Annual Maximum education level achieved within the household (years). 
Risk Aversion Constant Following Binswanger (1980), households were allowed to choose from a menu of real gambles 
in which level of risk and expected outcome were positively correlated. Each household 
participated in the experiment once during their first survey round. Households are then placed 
into a risk aversion category according to the lottery that they choose. The categories are risk 
neutral, moderately risk averse, and extremely risk averse. 
Dependency Ratio Annual Ratio of members that are younger than 15 years, older than 55 years, disabled, or clinically ill. 
Social Groups Annual A count of the number of informal groups in which the household participates. This variable is 
lagged by one period in the analysis. 
Asset Index Annual The asset index is generated by a factor analysis performed on more than 30 variables capturing 
asset ownership from the following categories: productive assets, household construction 
materials, household facilities, cooking and lighting fuels, and consumer durables. This variable 
is lagged by one period in the analysis. 
Ln income Seasonal Ln(1+ average monthly income) where income is the sum of the value of earnings, milk 
production, livestock slaughter, and livestock sales. Earnings include earnings from sale of 
crops, salaried employment, pensions, casual labor, business, petty trading, gifts, and 
remittances, expressed in Kenyan shillings (Ksh). This variable is lagged by one period. 
Ratio Livestock 
Income 
Seasonal Ratio of income that is generated through milk production, livestock slaughter or livestock 
sales. This variable is lagged by one period in the analysis. 
Herd Size Seasonal Average herd size during the sales window (1 TLU=0.7 camels=1 cattle=10 sheep=10 goats). 
This variable is lagged by one period in the analysis. 
Livestock Mortality 
Rate 
Seasonal Seasonal livestock mortality rate is calculated by dividing total losses within a season by the 
total herd owned within that season. Total herd owned is the sum of beginning herd size and all 
additions to the herd during the season. This variable is lagged by one period in the analysis. 
Risk Constant Within household variance in livestock mortality rate from the three periods before IBLI was 
introduced. 
Savings Annual A dummy variable that is equal to one if the household has cash savings sufficient to purchase 
IBLI insurance for ten TLUs. Savings are estimated by summing the total monies held at home, 
in merry-go-round groups, in micro-finance institutions, in savings and credit cooperatives, in 
bank accounts, with traders or shops, and in M-Pesa (a mobile-based micro-finance institution) 
accounts. This variable is lagged by one period in the analysis. 
HSNP  Seasonal Participation in HSNP (1=participant). This variable is lagged by one period. 
HNSP Eligible Seasonal HSNP transfers are currently being made in the household’s community and the household 
meets the eligibility criteria for its community. See Jensen, Barrett, and Mude (2016) for more 
information on the intent to treat variable. 
HSNP Community Seasonal Community is an HSNP target community (1=target community). 
Expected 
Rangeland: 
Good/Normal/Poor 
Annual A set of three dummy variables reflecting that the respondent’s prediction of coming season’s 
rangeland conditions were: much above normal or above normal (Good=1), normal 
(Normal=1), or somewhat below normal or much below normal (Poor=1). 
(Table continues) 
Table B1 
Description of Key Variables 
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(Continued) 
Ln(Effective Price) Seasonal Log of the price for one TLU of coverage after coupon discounts (ln(Ksh)). 
Basis Risk Seasonal The mean of squared observed underpayments.  
IBLI game Constant Household participated in the IBLI educational game in 2010 (1=participant). 
Coupon Seasonal Household received a discount coupon (1=true). 
Pre-Czndvi Seasonal Preceding season’s cumulative standardized normalized difference vegetation index.  
 
 
Table B2 provides summary statistics of the key variables, distinguishing between those that purchase 
and those that do not purchase IBLI. There seem to be a number of significant differences between those 
that do purchase IBLI and those that do not.  
 
 
 
Never Purchase 
(N=450) 
Did Purchase 
(N=382)    
Variable Mean Std. Err. Mean Std. Err. Difference t-stat 
Male 0.57 0.02 0.62 0.02 0.05 2.27 ** 
Age 47.8 0.55 47.8 0.55 0.06 0.07  
Education 4.14 0.14 4.56 0.16 0.42 2.04 ** 
Dependency Ratio 0.62 0.01 0.60 0.01 -0.02 -1.91 * 
Social Groups 0.55 0.02 0.77 0.03 0.21 5.67 *** 
Income  7,343 260 7,598 371 255 0.56  
Ratio Livestock Income  0.65 0.01 0.66 0.01 0.01 0.43  
Herd Size 12.0 0.56 12.3 0.61 0.34 0.42  
Asset Index -0.10 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.14 3.32 *** 
Savings 0.09 0.01 0.12 0.01 0.03 2.13 ** 
HSNP 0.36 0.01 0.29 0.02 -0.07 -3.00 *** 
HSNP Eligible 0.35 0.01 0.24 0.01 -0.12 -5.84 *** 
HSNP Community 0.61 0.02 0.50 0.02 -0.11 -4.58 *** 
Risk Aversion: Neutral 0.27 0.01 0.28 0.02 0.01 0.58  
Risk Aversion: Moderate 0.39 0.02 0.47 0.02 0.08 3.34 *** 
Risk Aversion: Extreme 0.34 0.02 0.25 0.02 -0.09 -4.18 *** 
Risk (x100) 7.09 0.38 5.89 0.29 -1.19 -2.49 ** 
Basis Risk (x100) 5.00 0.30 4.05 0.27 -0.95 -2.33 ** 
Subsidy -0.52 0.01 -0.49 0.01 0.03 3.63 *** 
IBLI Game 0.28 0.01 0.34 0.02 0.06 2.67 *** 
Expected Rangeland Conditions: Good -0.04 0.01 -0.04 0.01 0.00 0.07  
Expected Rangeland Conditions: Bad 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.01 -0.02 -1.46  
Pre-Czndvi -5.62 0.30 -5.79 0.32 -0.16 -0.37  
Division Average Losses (x100) 15.21 0.05 15.37 0.05 0.16 2.10 ** 
Division Average Basis Risk (x100) 4.73 0.11 4.79 0.12 0.00 0.39  
Coupon 0.56 0.02 0.66 0.02 0.10 4.30 *** 
Notes: This table only includes the 832 balanced panel households in order to correctly categorize the “Never Purchase” households and maintain 
consistency in the periods and shocks captured in the summary statistics. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
The asset index is constructed by performing a factor analysis on a set of variables meant to capture 
variation in household wealth. This approach is discussed in Sahn and Stifle (2000). The variables focus on 
five general categories: household construction materials, household facilities, cooking and lighting fuels, 
and household durables. Because the list of possible durables is extremely long (more than 70), they are 
aggregated by value (small, medium, large) and use (productive, other) except for large assets which are 
divided into those with motors and those without. Categorization was performed by the authors and is 
clearly not the only method for dividing or aggregating the long list of assets. When in doubt as to which 
category to place an item, we relied on the frequency of ownership to guild our decision. Table B3 includes 
the descriptions of each variable and the factor loadings, which were estimated using the variables listed 
and division year fixed effects.  
Table B2 
Summary Statistics 
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Variable Description 
Factor 
Loading 
Improved Wall =1 if walls are stone, brick, cement, corrugated iron, mud plastered with cement, or tin 0.132 
Improved Floor =1 if floor is cement, tile, or wood 0.130 
Improved Toilet =1 if toilet is flush or covered latrine 0.128 
Improved Light  =1 if main source of lighting is electricity, gas, solar 0.118 
Improved cooking 
appliance  
=1 if main cooking appliance is jiko, kerosene stove, gas cooker, or electric cooker 
0.077 
Improved Fuel  =1 if main cooking fuel is electricity, paraffin, gas or charcoal 0.064 
Improved furniture  Total number of the following assets: metal trunks, mosquito nets, modern chairs, modern tables, 
wardrobes, mattresses and modern beds 
0.165 
Water Source: Open =1 if main water source is river, lake, pond, unprotected well or unprotected spring 0.004 
Water Source: Protected =1 if main water source is protected spring or protected well 0.004 
Water Source: Borehole =1 if main water source is a borehole -0.008 
Water source: Tap =1 if main water source is a public or private tap 0.040 
Water Source: Rainwater 
catchment 
=1 if main water source is a rainwater catchment (usually cement or plastic) 
0.079 
Water Source: tanker =1 if main water source is water tanker (usually associated with NGO and food aid activities during 
drought) 
0.021 
Education Maximum household education 0.121 
Total cash savings Total monies held at home, in merry-go-round groups, in micro-finance institutions, in savings and 
credit cooperatives, in bank accounts, with traders or shops, and in M-Pesa (a mobile-based micro-
finance institution) accounts. 
0.085 
Land Hectares owned 0.051 
Irrigation =1 if household owns irrigated land 0.033 
Poultry Number of chickens 0.081 
Donkeys Number of donkeys 0.018 
Very small Total number of the following assets: gourds, cups, scissors, and needle and thread sets. 0.040 
Small tools Total number of the following assets: anvils, panier, sickle, pickaxe, hoe, spade, machetes, spears, bows, 
club, chisels, hammers, files, fishing lines. 
0.126 
Small other Total number of the following assets: musical instruments, traditional tools, bells, knifes, basins, 
sufirias, thermoses, buckets, wristwatches, jewelry  
0.053 
Medium tools Total number of the following assets: Wheelbarrows, fishing nets, mobile phones, washing machines, 
spinning machines, weaving machines, sewing machines, bicycles, and plows. 
0.164 
Medium other Total number of the following assets: water tank, jerry can, paraffin lamp, water drum, kerosene stove, 
charcoal stoves, ovens and radios.  
0.135 
Large  Total number of the following assets: animal carts, shops, stalls and boats. 0.037 
Large with motor Total number of the following assets: cars, motorbikes and tractors. 0.089 
Notes: Division*period dummies included in the factor analysis. 
 
 
Attrition rates averaged about 4% per year and the rate of attrition was similar between survey rounds. 
Table B4 provides details on the differences between full balanced panel households and those that left. 
Note that HSNP transfers, HSNP eligibility, participation in the IBLI extension game, the subsidy, 
(observed) basis risk, discount coupon, and expected conditions are all related to time so that we expect 
there to be systematic differences in those variables between those whom we observe in all periods and 
those that exit, due purely to exogenous factors. Those characteristics aside, there do seem to be differences 
in education, dependency ratio, social groups, dependence on livestock, and assets between those that are 
in the full panel and those that entered/left. 
  
  
Table B3 
Asset Index 
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Full Panel Left/Entered 
      
(N=832) (N=94) 
Variable Mean Std. Err. Mean Std. Err. Difference t-stat 
Male 0.59 0.02 0.63 0.05 0.04 0.83  
Age 47.5 0.76 47.6 1.38 0.13 0.08  
Education 4.15 0.20 2.78 0.39 -1.37 -3.17 *** 
Dependency Ratio 0.62 0.01 0.56 0.02 -0.05 -2.34 ** 
Social Groups 0.60 0.03 0.45 0.05 -0.15 -2.48 ** 
Income 7,371 374 7,006 817 -366 -0.41  
Ratio Livestock Income 0.7 0.02 0.5 0.05 -0.11 -2.22 ** 
Herd Size 14.1 0.71 13.5 1.67 -0.58 -0.32  
Asset Index -0.06 0.04 -0.30 0.06 -0.24 -3.30 *** 
Savings 0.10 0.01 0.13 0.03 0.03 0.79  
HSNP 0.24 0.01 0.17 0.03 -0.07 -2.19 ** 
HSNP Eligible 0.23 0.02 0.07 0.02 -0.16 -6.02 *** 
HSNP Community 0.56 0.02 0.53 0.05 -0.03 -0.54  
Risk Aversion: Neutral 0.27 0.02 0.34 0.05 0.07 1.36  
Risk Aversion: Moderate 0.43 0.02 0.40 0.05 -0.02 -0.45  
Risk Aversion: Extreme 0.30 0.02 0.26 0.04 -0.04 -0.92  
Risk (x100) 6.64 0.51 9.84 2.00 3.20 1.55  
Basis Risk (x100) 2.99 0.21 1.49 0.31 -1.50 -4.02 *** 
Subsidy -0.60 0.00 -0.65 0.01 -0.04 -4.83 *** 
IBLI Game 0.30 0.02 0.16 0.04 -0.15 -3.40 *** 
Expected Rangeland Conditions: Good 0.21 0.01 0.12 0.02 -0.09 -4.72 *** 
Expected Rangeland Conditions: Bad 0.40 0.01 0.20 0.02 -0.20 -8.55 *** 
Pre-Czndvi -2.91 0.07 -2.22 0.54 0.69 1.28  
Division Average Losses (x100) 15.28 0.07 14.99 0.18 -0.28 -1.46  
Division Average Basis Risk 3.20 0.04 3.20 0.29 0.00 0.01  
Coupon 0.60 0.01 0.37 0.04 -0.23 -5.44 *** 
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
The survey teams used a census of households with herd sizes in order to replace exit households with 
households from the same wealth stratum. Thus we expect that the exiting and replacement households are 
similar. Descriptive statistics are found in Table B5. Most of the systematic differences are likely due to 
duration of survey participation and likelihood of participating during certain periods rather than actual 
differences between households. Omitting those explicitly tied to time, the differences that are most 
worrisome are herd size and ratio of income from livestock, which indicate that replacement households 
have much smaller herds and are more dependent on those herds than those that left. This is most likely a 
result of over-sampling in the wealthy household strata, which leaves fewer eligible replacements for 
attrited wealthy households, which means that less wealthy households often replaced those that left from 
the wealth strata.31 
  
                                                     
31 Large portions of the middle and high wealth strata were sampled in some smaller communities. In such cases, finding within 
strata replacement households can be difficult. Pastoral mobility and demand for herding labor far from households and community 
centers further exacerbates the challenges of replacing households from an already attenuated roster.  
Table B4 
Summary Statistics for Those that Stayed and Those that Left/Entered the Survey 
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Exit Enter 
     
(N=91) (N=91) 
Variable Mean Std. Err. Mean Std. Err. Difference t-stat 
Male 0.62 0.07 0.64 0.07 0.02 0.17  
Age 47.4 1.95 47.8 1.95 0.43 0.15  
Education 3.43 0.54 2.19 0.56 -1.25 -1.60  
Dependency Ratio 0.59 0.03 0.54 0.03 -0.04 -1.03  
Social Groups 0.40 0.08 0.50 0.07 0.09 0.85  
Income 5,901 1,074 8,017 1,207 2,116 1.31  
Ratio Livestock Income 0.37 0.05 0.71 0.06 0.34 4.21 *** 
Herd Size 18.6 3.10 8.8 1.20 -9.78 -2.94 *** 
Asset Index -0.30 0.07 -0.31 0.10 0.00 -0.04  
Savings 0.09 0.04 0.15 0.05 0.06 1.04  
HSNP 0.12 0.04 0.22 0.04 0.11 1.99  
HSNP Eligible 0.06 0.02 0.27 0.10 0.21 2.12 * 
HSNP Community 0.51 0.07 0.55 0.07 0.04 0.36  
Risk Aversion: Neutral 0.28 0.06 0.40 0.07 0.12 1.31  
Risk Aversion: Moderate 0.40 0.07 0.41 0.07 0.01 0.13  
Risk Aversion: Extreme 0.32 0.07 0.19 0.05 -0.13 -1.56  
Risk (x100) 10.06 2.08 4.23 2.14 -5.83 -1.96 * 
Basis Risk (x100) 0.33 0.13 2.54 0.56 2.21 3.86 *** 
Subsidy -0.67 0.01 -0.63 0.01 0.04 2.48 ** 
IBLI Game 0.32 0.07 0.00 0.00 -0.32 -4.70 *** 
Expected Rangeland Conditions: Good 0.12 0.02 0.11 0.02 -0.01 -0.36  
Expected Rangeland Conditions: Bad 0.22 0.03 0.18 0.02 -0.04 -1.12  
Pre-Czndvi -5.70 0.36 0.97 0.74 6.67 8.10 *** 
Division Average Losses (x100) 15.05 0.27 14.94 0.24 -0.11 -0.31  
Division Average Basis Risk 1.01 0.17 5.21 0.28 4.20 12.98 *** 
Coupon 0.62 0.08 0.24 0.03 -0.38 -4.23 *** 
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
  
Table B5 
Summary Statistics for Entry Vs. Exit Households 
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Appendix C: Balancing Tables for IBLI Coupon and IBLI Educational Game 
The period examined by this research included four sales periods, and thus four rounds of random 
discount coupons distribution. By the fourth round, most households had received a discount coupon at 
least once and many had received more than one (Table C1).  
 
Number of discounts received Frequency 
0 139 
1 326 
2 203 
3 135 
4 29 
 
As a check of balance for the coupons, we create a two treatment intensity variables (1) the number of 
coupons received, and (2) the sum of the percent discounts received. Those two variables are then separately 
regressed onto the baseline values of the set of covariates used in the main regression (Table C2). If certain 
types of households were favored or penalized by the randomization, it will be apparent in statistically 
significant coefficient estimates in the regressions. We use the balanced panel for this regression so that we 
do not conflate the impact of shorter panels with unbalanced treatments. Of the fifteen coefficient estimates 
examined, two, ratio of income from livestock and savings, show statistical evidence of unbalance. 
Randomization favored those that rely more on livestock for their income and those with more savings. The 
rate of coefficient estimates that are statistically different at the 10% level is 13%, 3% higher than expected 
but still quite close. As a precaution, we are sure to control for ratio of income from livestock and savings 
in all of our analysis. 
We also check for balance across the IBLI extension game. The extension game was implemented by 
randomly selecting about half of the households from a random selection of 9 of the 16 sublocations. See 
McPeak, Chantarat, and Mude (2010) for more information on implementation. We check for balance 
across households within those 9 communities in which the game was played (Table C3).  There are very 
few differences, although the sub-sample of participants are more likely to be extremely risk averse than 
their non-participant counterparts. We have no hypothesis as to why that may be but are sure to control for 
level of risk aversion in all of our analysis.  
 
  
Table C1 
Distribution of Coupons by the Final Survey Round 
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 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Count of Discount Coupons Sum of Discounts Received 
Head is Male -0.0127 0.0366 
 (0.0998) (0.0408) 
Age of Head 0.0025 0.0008 
 (0.0025) (0.0012) 
Maximum Education in the Household 0.0024 -0.0055 
 (0.0120) (0.0054) 
Dependency Ratio -0.1617 -0.0291 
 (0.2405) (0.1046) 
Social Groups -0.0340 -0.0146 
 (0.0550) (0.0252) 
Income (1,000 KSH) 0.0000 0.0000 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Ratio Income Livestock 0.2271** 0.0944** 
 (0.1029) (0.0445) 
TLU -0.0010 -0.0004 
 (0.0018) (0.0008) 
Asset Index -0.0147 -0.0052 
 (0.0591) (0.0262) 
Savings (10 TLU) 0.4640** 0.2506** 
 (0.1871) (0.0998) 
Will be HSNP participant 0.0675 0.0010 
 (0.1206) (0.0516) 
HSNP Sublocaiton 0.0877 0.0357 
 (0.1167) (0.0547) 
Risk Aversion: Moderate 0.0562 0.0392 
 (0.1012) (0.0464) 
Risk Aversion: Extreme 0.1095 0.0228 
 (0.1222) (0.0517) 
Participated in IBLI Extension Game 0.0750 0.0484 
 (0.1038) (0.0471) 
Constant 1.9874*** 0.6513*** 
 (0.2453) (0.1083) 
   
Observations 772 772 
R-squared 0.0464 0.0422 
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 
 Did Not Play IBLI Game 
(N=302) 
Played IBLI Extension Game 
(N=275)    
VARIABLES Mean Std. Err. Mean Std. Err. Difference t-stat 
Head is Male 0.49 0.04 0.57 0.04 0.09 1.50  
Age of Head 44.2 1.29 47.5 1.53 3.38 1.69 * 
Maximum Education in the 
Household 3.16 0.31 3.07 0.29 -0.09 -0.20  
Dependency Ratio 0.63 0.02 0.62 0.02 -0.01 -0.43  
Social Groups 0.40 0.06 0.45 0.06 0.05 0.60  
Income (1,000 KSH) 4,505 498 3,872 477 -633 -0.92  
Ratio Income Livestock 0.49 0.04 0.50 0.04 0.01 0.21  
TLU 19.8 2.06 18.9 2.54 -0.85 -0.26  
Asset Index -0.25 0.05 -0.27 0.05 -0.02 -0.31  
Savings (10 TLU) 0.06 0.02 0.06 0.02 0.00 -0.12  
Will be HSNP participant 0.33 0.04 0.32 0.04 -0.01 -0.15  
HSNP Sublocation 0.48 0.04 0.47 0.04 -0.01 -0.14  
Risk Aversion: Extreme 0.26 0.04 0.44 0.04 0.18 3.27 *** 
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 
Table C.2 
Balance Check for Coupon Distribution: Coefficient Estimates from Regressing Characteristics onto Coupon Status 
 
Table C.3 
Balance Check for the Randomized Game Participation within Treated Sublocations 
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Appendix D. Coefficient Estimates and AME of Demand from a Pooled Model 
  Uptake  Level (TLU) 
VARIABLES Coefficient Std. Err.  Coefficient Std. Err. 
Household Period-Specific Characteristics:     
Male A 0.0870 (0.0865)  0.1698** (0.0830) 
Age A -0.0079* (0.0046)  -0.0109** (0.0043) 
Age2 A -0.0001 (0.0003)  -0.0000 (0.0003) 
Education A 0.0050 (0.0442)  0.0103 (0.0454) 
Dependency Ratio A 0.7030** (0.3300)  0.6509* (0.3746) 
Social Groups A 0.0140 (0.0620)  0.0216 (0.0521) 
Ln(income) A 0.0119 (0.0262)  0.0139 (0.0266) 
Ln(income)2 A  0.0047 (0.0045)  -0.0025 (0.0044) 
Ratio income livestock A -0.1345 (0.1339)  -0.2688** (0.1358) 
TLU A 0.0066* (0.0040)  0.0118*** (0.0038) 
TLU2 A -0.0002 (0.0001)  -0.0002 (0.0001) 
Asset Index -0.1276 (0.1194)  -0.0933 (0.0981) 
Savings (10TLU) A -0.3079 (0.1909)  -0.2135 (0.1932) 
HSNP A 0.2709 (0.1681)  0.3140** (0.1325) 
HSNP Eligible A 0.0556 (0.1904)  -0.0852 (0.1876) 
HSNP Village -0.1362* (0.0827)  -0.0737 (0.0891) 
Moderately Risk Averse -0.0367 (0.0956)  -0.0333 (0.0905) 
Extremely Risk Averse -0.2438** (0.1058)  -0.1383 (0.0936) 
Risk -0.9276** (0.4535)  -0.5728 (0.4718) 
Discount Coupon (=1 if recipient)  0.2772*** (0.0886)    
      
Hypothesis 1: Basis Risk And Price      
Basis Risk -1.2360 (1.2806)  -0.5496 (1.1530) 
Ln (Subsidy) 1.0502*** (0.2766)  1.3861*** (0.2158) 
Basis Risk x Ln (Subsidy) -1.9820 (2.1852)  -0.3184 (2.0074) 
      
Hypothesis 2: Basis Risk And Learning      
Game 0.2651** (0.1170)  0.2129** (0.0988) 
Basis Risk X Game -3.1822** (1.2815)  -2.0098* (1.1015) 
      
Hypothesis 3: Intertemporal Adverse Selection 
    
Expected Conditions: Good=1 B -0.0977 (0.0951)  -0.0882 (0.0852) 
Expected Conditions: Bad=1 B -0.2417** (0.1044)  -0.2435** (0.1110) 
Pre-CZNDVI -0.0091** (0.0046)  -0.0071 (0.0053) 
      
Hypothesis 4: Spatial Adverse Selection      
Division Average Loss Rate  3.8613 (2.4541)  1.4348 (2.3456) 
Division Average Basis Risk  -4.2090** (1.8857)  -1.3583 (1.7809) 
Division Average Basis Risk X Game -1.2328 (2.5023)  -3.2869 (2.1188) 
      
Observations     3,096 
Wald test of Independent Equations 𝜒2     160.35 
Model Wald 𝜒2     146.80 
Notes: Additional covariates not listed above include time dummies and a constant. A Variable is demeaned and lagged one period. B Variable is 
demeaned. #Omitted variable is Expected conditions: poor. Household clustered and robust standard errors in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, 
* p<0.1 
 
  
Table D1 
Coefficient Estimates on Demand for IBLI (Pooled Model) 
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  Uptake  Level (TLU) 
VARIABLES AME Std. Err.  AME Std. Err. 
Household Period-Specific Characteristics:     
Male A 0.0198 (0.0196)  0.1698** (0.0830) 
Age A -0.0018* (0.0010)  -0.0109** (0.0044) 
Education A 0.0011 (0.0101)  0.0103 (0.0454) 
Dependency Ratio A 0.1601** (0.0760)  0.6509* (0.3746) 
Social Groups A 0.0032 (0.0141)  0.0216 (0.0521) 
Ln(income) A 0.0031 (0.0063)  0.0121 (0.0287) 
Ratio income livestock A -0.0306 (0.0303)  -0.2688** (0.1358) 
TLU A 0.0016* (0.0009)  0.0127*** (0.0040) 
Asset Index A -0.0291 (0.0271)  -0.0933 (0.0981) 
Savings (10TLU) A -0.0701 (0.0435)  -0.2135 (0.1932) 
HSNP A 0.0617 (0.0382)  0.3140** (0.1325) 
HSNP Eligible A 0.0127 (0.0434)  -0.0852 (0.1876) 
HSNP Village -0.0310* (0.0188)  -0.0737 (0.0891) 
Moderately Risk Averse -0.0084 (0.0217)  -0.0333 (0.0905) 
Extremely Risk Averse -0.0555** (0.0239)  -0.1383 (0.0936) 
Risk -0.2113** (0.1032)  -0.5728 (0.4718) 
Discount Coupon (=1 if recipient)  0.0631*** (0.0202)    
      
Hypothesis 1: Basis Risk And Price      
Basis Risk -0.2924** (0.1244)  -0.9814** (0.4583) 
Ln (Subsidy) 0.2230*** (0.0588)  1.3716*** (0.1893) 
      
Hypothesis 2: Basis Risk And Learning      
Game 0.0265 (0.0200)  -0.0243 (0.0745) 
      
Hypothesis 3: Intertemporal Adverse Selection 
    
Expected Conditions: Good=1 B, C -0.0222 (0.0217)  -0.0882 (0.0852) 
Expected Conditions: Bad=1 B, C -0.0550** (0.0239)  -0.2435** (0.1110) 
Pre-CZNDVI -0.0021** (0.0010)  -0.0071 (0.0053) 
      
Hypothesis 4: Spatial Adverse Selection      
Division Average Loss Rate  0.8794 (0.5599)  1.4348 (2.3456) 
Division Average Basis Risk  -1.0437*** (0.3746)  -2.3292 (1.5562) 
      
Observations     3,096 
Wald Test of Independent Equations 𝜒2    177.45 
Model Wald 𝜒2     146.80 
Notes: Additional covariates not listed above include time dummies and a constant. A Variable is demeaned and lagged one period. B Omitted 
variable is Expected conditions: normal. C Variable is demeaned. Household clustered and robust standard errors in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
  
Table D2 
Average Marginal Effects (AME) on Demand for IBLI (Pooled Model) 
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Appendix E: Shapley Goodness of Fit Decomposition 
A Shapley’s goodness of fit (GOF) decomposition is used to determine the level of variation in demand 
that is captured by categories of variables (Kolenikov & Shorrocks 2005; Shapley 1953; Shorrocks 2013).32 
The variable categories include: household demographics, household finances, price, basis risk and 
knowledge, prospective intertemporal adverse selection, and prospective spatial adverse selection and the 
instrument variable/inverse Mills ratio. A two-stage Heckman approach, rather than the maximum 
likelihood approach used in the main body of the paper, is used here in order to examine the contributions 
of the variable groups in both the uptake and demand analysis.  
Tables E1 and E2 include the two-stage estimates and estimated group contributions to each stage’s 
(uptake and level of purchase) GOF. The maximum likelihood estimates from the Heckman selection model 
(from Table 6) are also included as evidence that the two models result in very similar estimates and that 
the decomposition of the two-stage estimates are likely to be reflective of the contributions in the maximum 
likelihood Heckman model.33  
Household characteristics clearly play a role in uptake but are unable to account for even half of the 
variation captured by the model (Table E1 and Table E2). The subsidy alone provides about 10% of the 
GOF of our model for both uptake and level. Basis risk and knowledge are nearly as important in the uptake 
decision as the subsidy, but their importance falls for the coverage decision. Temporal and spatial adverse 
selection provide similar contributions and their combined impacts are larger than the basis risk and 
knowledge group, illustrating the importance of this rarely examined component of demand for index 
insurance.  
In summary, the total contribution made by basis risk, knowledge of the product, and adverse selection 
towards the GOF are on par with the importance of price in our model. Our models would perform much 
worse with these crucial estimates of basis risk and adverse selection. 
  
                                                     
32 We use the STATA user-written command shapley2 (Juárez 2014). 
33  The ML Heckman estimates are generated in a single step so that we cannot examine the goodness of fit 
contributions in each process separately. 
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Table E1 
Decomposition of Pseudo R2 for Uptake Probit 
  Heckman ML Probit 
 
2 Step Probit 
 Shapley Decomposition 
of Pseudo R2 A 
VARIABLES Coefficient Std. Err.  Coefficient Std. Err.   
Household Specific Characteristics:       
Demographics:       29.93% 
Male A 0.0226 (0.0907)  0.0271 (0.1015)   
Age A -0.0080* (0.0048)  -0.0079 (0.0055)   
Age2 A 0.0000 (0.0002)  0.0001 (0.0002)   
Education A 0.0147 (0.0432)  0.0071 (0.0529)   
Dependency Ratio A 0.7795** (0.3335)  0.7717** (0.3515)   
Social Groups A 0.0494 (0.0553)  0.0391 (0.0599)   
HSNP Eligible 0.1037 (0.1980)  0.0798 (0.2092)   
HSNP Village  0.0673 (0.1201)  -0.0073 (0.1244)   
Moderately Risk Averse -0.0444 (0.0931)  -0.0282 (0.0998)   
Extremely Risk Averse -0.1902* (0.1040)  -0.2196* (0.1137)   
Risk -0.8503* (0.5083)  -0.8242 (0.5585)   
        
Financial:       17.95% 
Ln(income) A 0.0348 (0.0285)  0.0347 (0.0302)   
Ln(income)2 A  0.0095** (0.0047)  0.0125** (0.0052)   
Ratio income livestock A -0.1600 (0.1404)  -0.1429 (0.1478)   
TLU A 0.0061 (0.0041)  0.0045 (0.0043)   
TLU2 A -0.0002 (0.0001)  -0.0002 (0.0001)   
Asset Index -0.1805* (0.1039)  -0.1914 (0.1225)   
Savings (10TLU) A -0.3485** (0.1717)  -0.2482 (0.1866)   
HSNP A 0.3207* (0.1722)  0.3024 (0.1890)   
        
Subsidy: 0.9684*** (0.2881)  0.2176 (0.3596)  10.94% 
        
Basis Risk And IBLI Knowledge       9.13% 
Basis Risk -0.9527 (1.2988)  -0.7069 (1.3772)   
Basis Risk x Ln (Subsidy) -1.8647 (2.1765)  -1.2634 (2.3712)   
Game 0.3024*** (0.1160)  0.3073** (0.1266)   
Basis Risk X Game -2.6114** (1.2046)  -2.7586** (1.3082)   
        
Intertemporal Adverse Selection      5.31% 
Expected Conditions: Good=1 B -0.0825 (0.0979)  -0.0742 (0.1029)   
Expected Conditions: Bad=1 B -0.2477** (0.1035)  -0.2991*** (0.1062)   
Pre-CZNDVI -0.0085* (0.0046)  -0.0105** (0.0048)   
Household Mean Expected Conditions: 
Good=1 0.0803 (0.1678)  
0.1408 (0.1779)   
Household Mean Expected Conditions: 
Bad=1  -0.0136 (0.1898)  
0.0279 (0.2082)   
        
Spatial Adverse Selection       4.78% 
Division Average Loss Rate  5.6283** (2.7645)  6.3534** (3.0101)   
Division Average Basis Risk  -4.8524** (1.9611)  -4.3827** (2.0925)   
Division Average Basis Risk X Game -2.2374 (2.5614)  -1.9889 (2.7500)   
        
Instrumental Variable:       21.95% 
Discount Coupon (=1 if recipient)  0.2858*** (0.0883)  0.6509*** (0.1355)   
        
Observations 3,096   3,096    
Wald test of Independent Equations 𝜒2 177.45       
Model Wald 𝜒2 174.49   235.51    
Psuedo R2    0.132    
Notes: A Variable is demeaned and lagged one period. The variable’s within household mean is also included as a covariate in the same group, 
but is not display in the table. B Variable is demeaned. #Omitted variable is Expected conditions: poor. Household clustered and robust standard 
errors in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table E2 
Decomposition R2 for Level of Coverage Purchased, Conditional on Purchasing 
  Heckman ML Probit 
 
2 Step Probit 
 Shapley Decomposition 
of Pseudo R2 A 
VARIABLES Coefficient Std. Err.  Coefficient Std. Err.   
Household Specific Characteristics:       
Demographics:       22.68% 
Male A 0.0824 (0.0836)  0.1009* (0.0582)   
Age A -0.0069 (0.0048)  -0.0038 (0.0063)   
Age2 A 0.0001 (0.0002)  -0.0000 (0.0003)   
Education A 0.0328 (0.0388)  0.0354 (0.0319)   
Dependency Ratio A 0.5702 (0.3535)  0.2802 (0.3209)   
Social Groups A 0.0278 (0.0486)  0.0157 (0.0424)   
HSNP Eligible 0.2681* (0.1416)  0.0076 (0.1926)   
HSNP Village  -0.0348 (0.1324)  0.0433 (0.0736)   
Moderately Risk Averse -0.0337 (0.0832)  -0.0166 (0.0590)   
Extremely Risk Averse -0.1105 (0.0924)  -0.0142 (0.0754)   
Risk -0.6441 (0.4690)  -0.2997 (0.3714)   
        
Financial:       14.70% 
Ln(income) A 0.0322 (0.0249)  0.0207 (0.0183)   
Ln(income)2 A  0.0053 (0.0040)  -0.0017 (0.0038)   
Ratio income livestock A -0.2280* (0.1331)  -0.2377*** (0.0910)   
TLU A 0.0088** (0.0036)  0.0080** (0.0034)   
TLU2 A -0.0001 (0.0001)  0.0000 (0.0001)   
Asset Index -0.0510 (0.0801)  0.0349 (0.0686)   
Savings (10TLU) A -0.1735 (0.1609)  -0.0499 (0.1187)   
HSNP A 0.2681* (0.1416)  0.2056 (0.1349)   
        
Subsidy: 1.2544*** (0.2129)  0.7553*** (0.2357)  13.04% 
        
Basis Risk And Knowledge:       4.62% 
Basis Risk -1.1880 (1.1407)  -1.4121 (1.1789)   
Basis Risk x Ln (Subsidy) -1.6360 (1.9513)  -2.0493 (2.2882)   
Game 0.2161** (0.0939)  0.0945 (0.0850)   
Basis Risk X Game -1.4809 (1.0525)  -0.3405 (1.0352)   
        
Intertemporal Adverse Selection:      2.61% 
Expected Conditions: Good=1 B -0.1053 (0.0845)  -0.0803 (0.0710)   
Expected Conditions: Bad=1 B -0.2514** (0.0999)  -0.0368 (0.0929)   
Pre-CZNDVI -0.0087* (0.0046)  -0.0021 (0.0041)   
Household Mean Expected Conditions: Good=1 0.2127 (0.1431)  0.0810 (0.1146)   
Household Mean Expected Conditions: Bad=1 0.4579*** (0.1751)  0.3711*** (0.1163)   
        
Spatial Adverse Selection       4.05% 
Division Average Loss Rate  3.9716 (2.6839)  0.2245 (1.9542)   
Division Average Basis Risk  -2.4986 (1.8095)  -0.6512 (1.5055)   
Division Average Basis Risk X Game -3.6911* (2.1707)  -3.4996** (1.7533)   
        
Selection:       38.30% 
Rho/Inverse Mills Ratio  0.9735*** (0.0107)  0.2123 (0.1662)   
        
Observations 3,096   3,096    
Wald test of Independent Equations 𝜒2 177.45       
Model Wald 𝜒2 174.49       
R2        
Notes: A Variable is demeaned and lagged one period. The variable’s within household mean is also included as a covariate in the same group, 
but is not display in the table. B Variable is demeaned. #Omitted variable is Expected conditions: poor. Household clustered and robust standard 
errors in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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